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Many databases rely on documents (research) of the past to input data to create a 
comprehensive database.  The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) is one such document.  
The SARs are pervasive documents that have undergone decades of scrutiny by Congress 
and watchdog organizations such as the Government Accountability Office.  Since the 
SAR has undergone such massive evolutionary changes, creating an accurate acquisition 
database presents a daunting task for the analyst and researcher alike.  This research 
concerns itself with one such database.   
 From this prior research database, we look to fill in missing data.  We first 
conduct a literature review to determine why we have database discontinuity.  Indeed, a 
large part of our review entails SARs.  We find there are no other complete sources for 
acquisition reporting.  Also, the reason for missing data stems from 30 years of change 
within the Department of Defense administration.  In addition, we grow concerned about 
the number of rebaselines a program undergoes in its lifecycle.  Investigating this, we add 
the variable # of Rebaselines to schedule and cost regression models from prior research 
for statistical evaluation.  We find our new variable is highly predictive with past 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND ITS IMPACT ON PREDICTING SCHEDULE & COST 
RISK 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
 Many databases used in research have missing data and disparity amongst the data 
points.  Hence, the more data missing from the database, the less useful it is to the 
researcher.  Many documents of the past are inputted by the hand of the researcher to 
create a comprehensive database.  The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) is one such 
document that dates back to the late sixties.  Indeed, the SAR is a pervasive document 
that has undergone decades of change and scrutiny by Congress and watchdog 
organizations such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Since the SAR has 
undergone such massive evolutionary changes for over 30 years, creating an accurate 
acquisition database presents a daunting task for the analyst and researcher alike.  This 
research concerns itself with one such database created by Sipple (2002:124-125) and 
revised by Monaco (2005).   
 Monaco’s research pertains to a database derived from SARs; Monaco noted 
some limitations in his thesis starting on page 109.  One such limitation pertained to the 
predictive model.  Monaco needed a complete set of data in order for the statistical 
models to accurately predict the probability and magnitude of schedule growth within the 
time frame of the EMD phase of acquisition (defined as the interval between MS II and 
MS III).  Monaco (2005) found that approximately 27% of programs that otherwise met 
the researcher’s criteria did not have a reported value for one of the four necessary 
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schedule dates, e.g.  planned and actual dates for Milestone II and Milestone III.  Of the 
programs missing the appropriate schedule dates, Planned MS II, Actual MS II, Planned 
MS III, and Actual MS III did not have complete data 56%, 28%, 72%, and 56% of the 
time respectively.   
 In addition, Monaco (2005) observed the following missing schedule dates that 
showed promise as possible predictor variables: First Unit Equipped (FUE), Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), Production Contract Award (PCA), Critical Design Review 
(CDR), EMD Contract Award, and Initial Operating Capability (IOC).  Due to the fact 
that the SARs contained missing schedule information, Monaco could not decompose the 
interval between MS II to MS III in order to create predictive models within smaller time 
frames.  In particular, the FUE schedule date also appeared to be very predictable but 
only present in 19.4% of the programs (Monaco, 2005).   
Specific Issue 
 The missing data in Monaco's thesis is the springboard for this research.  This 
research determines if there is actually missing data in the SAR.  If the data is missing, 
this research resolves to determine why it is missing.  Once we determine why the data is 
missing, then we look for other venues or databases available that can fill in the holes.  
The primary objective of this research contends to build up the current database that 
Sipple (2002) and Monaco (2005) have derived and possibly add new variables to the 
model to enhance it.   
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 The Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are a collection of reports from major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) e.g. programs that are in acquisition category 
(ACAT) I).  These reports include key cost, technical, schedule, program variance, and 
other program information.  The primary information that is gathered for this research 
depends on the accuracy and quality of these reports.   
 Another limitation pertains to the area of limited research material associated with 
the Selected Acquisition Report.  A preliminary research examination reveals very little 
research directed solely on the Selected Acquisition Report.  This research is also limited 
to only unclassified programs that complete the EMD phase of acquisition.   
Research Objectives 
 The objective of this thesis is threefold.  First, this research explores the reasons 
for the missing data.  Second, this research attempts to build up the current database and 
add potential enhancing variables to it.  Third, this investigation reruns the Monaco 
(2005) model and possibly other models.  We then compare the results and determine if 
the model(s) remain stable and consistent with the original research.  This thesis attempts 
to use the same logistic regression and multiple regression model(s) used in the research 
of Monaco and others to validate and compare results. 
Thesis Overview 
 Finding answers to this research first requires literature review.  This portion of 
the thesis, Chapter II, provides answers as to why there is missing data and helps us 
devise a suitable methodology to answer our research objectives.  This section of research 
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also aids to the possibility of adding new variables into the model.  The literature review 
in Chapter II also provides a solid foundation for this research to formulate a suitable 
strategy to answer our research objectives in Chapter III.  Indeed, in Chapter III we 
gather the data and the insight we gain in Chapter II to catapult this research into making 
some preliminary assumptions and framing a suitable methodology to answer our thesis.  
In Chapter IV, we test theory and validate it for accuracy against the schedule model of 
Monaco (2005) and the total RDT&E cost model of Genest (2004).  Finally, in Chapter 
V, we provide conclusions to our thesis, and possible venues for follow-on research.   
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II.  Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Designing/Creating a major weapons system is complex and full of uncertainty.  
Analyzing the paper trail of the weapon system can be a daunting task if people, policy, 
and procedures are not consistent and meticulously followed.  We find this disparity in 
multiple GAO reports and changing policy for more than 30 years.  To fully understand 
the complexity of the information and documentation associated with a major weapons 
system, this research looks to historic documentation for some of the answers.  Based on 
misinformation and data acquired from the selected acquisition report (SAR) and newly 
researched historical information and data, this thesis develops a foundation to enhance 
the database.  We attempt to do this by filling in missing data or enhancing the data with 
new predictive variables.  Chapter III covers this aforementioned methodology.   
Reasons for Missing Data 
 This research looks for data across DoD to enhance the Monaco (2005) study on 
schedule slippage in an attempt to find its missing holes.  In addition to looking forward 
to new data sources, this thesis also looks at the most commonly used data source for the 
analysis of major weapon systems, the SAR.  As we describe in our methodology in 
Chapter III, we perform an exhaustive search for databases associated with MDAPs 
(major defense acquisition programs) and it proves to be futile.  However, our analysis of 
the literature associated with the SAR supports the theory that the SAR is the only 
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database comprehensive enough to provide the information we need for analysis.  The 
following documents address some of these issues: 
 Letter to Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, 1973 
The Comptroller General prepared this document in response to a request from 
the office of the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.  The request asked for a 
brief history including past and present recommendations and Department of Defense 
actions taken in response to the recommendations of the comptroller's office in relation to 
the DoD selected acquisition report (SAR).  It is noteworthy to mention that there are 
numerous reproduction artifacts that make many portions of this document illegible.  
There are also stamps across the document that state “BEST DOCUMENT 
AVAILABLE.” 
The letter starts with the SAR’s genesis and history.  The historical portion noted 
the first DoD instruction to associate with the SAR.  DoD instruction 7000.3 of February 
1968 was the first authoritative guidance that established the mandatory SAR 
requirement.  Before the introduction of the SAR, no recurring reports existed on major 
acquisitions for a comparison with prior and later estimates that retained cost, schedule, 
and performance data.  The document went on to say the SAR system’s initial purpose 
focused on keeping its sponsor, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
apprised of the progress of selected acquisitions.  Another primary purpose of the SAR 
dealt with comparing MDAP progress with planned technical, schedule, and cost 
performance.   
DoD used the SAR in an experimental stage during 1968 and only required eight 
programs to be reported via the SAR.  In early 1969, the Secretary of Defense established 
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an objective that he be advised regularly of the status of major acquisitions.  
Concurrently, the Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee concluded that 
Congress should also be regularly informed of the progress of DoD acquisitions and 
requested periodic reports on such programs.  After deliberation by all parties, they 
decided that SARs would be used to advise top DoD management and Congress of the 
progress of major acquisitions.  As a result of this decision, the SAR became and remains 
the key recurring report from project managers and the services to inform the Secretary of 
Defense and Congress on the progress of its major acquisition programs. 
The document went on to mention the improvements in the SAR since its 
inception.  DoD, the office of the comptroller general, and other congressional 
committees championed these system improvements.  The document also includes quotes 
from the House Committee on Armed Services in its report to Congress on April 24, 
1970 (91st Congress, second session).  We include the following quotes to show the 
essence of the SAR of the 70’s: 
 “With valuable suggestions made by the comptroller general, the SARs are being 
improved to the point where they can become a significant aid to better program 
management.  The manner in which the SARs are presented to the committee, 
however, leaves much to be desired.” 
* * * * * * * * *  
“The Department of Defense has sometimes arbitrarily eliminated statistical 
information or otherwise altered the material submitted to the Committee.” 
* * * * * * * * *   
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“The committee is, likewise, disturbed by the timeliness with which the SARs are 
submitted to the Committee by the Department of Defense.  In many cases the 
Committee has not received the SARs…until as much as three months after the 
close of the reporting period.  This greatly lessens their effectiveness to the 
committee, particularly during the period when the annual authorization is being 
considered.” 
* * * * * * * * *   
“In its attempt to gain a more detailed portrait of military spending, the committee 
has become concerned about the inconsistency of various reporting and estimating 
methods in relation to weapons costs” (Staats, 1973).  This document went on to 
mention other recommendations to include improvements by DoD.   
The first DoD improvement enhanced their definition of costs to include special 
vocabulary of the following four terms that should be uniformly applied and understood:  
“flyaway costs,” “weapon system costs,” “procurement costs,” and “program acquisition 
costs.”  DoD intended to avoid any future discrepancies by clarifying the aforementioned 
terms to prevent the ambiguity associated by poorly defined definitions in times past.   
DoD’s next improvement pertained to the application of inflation.  A report 
written in April 24, 1970 in response to the Secretary of Defense report of April 24, 1970, 
pointed out that some practical measure of inflationary trends was necessary so DoD 
issued a memorandum on June 30, 1970 titled Weapon System Costing.  The 
memorandum stated that cost estimates should reflect the best estimates of the amounts 
ultimately to be paid, specifically incorporating anticipated changes in future prices.  The 
estimates should also be accomplished on the basis of specific data applicable to a given 
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system considering such factors as contract provisions, labor agreements, productivity, 
quantity changes, and the extent to which material is on hand or under fixed-price 
contract.  The memorandum also stated that these policies would be set forth in the 
September 30, 1970 SARs.   
Another DoD initiative made changes in data presentation.  In 1970 and 1971 
SARs were rather large, some reaching 60 pages or more.  Since DoD recognized that 
management could not have time to review and analyze such large documents, they 
revised DoD instruction 7000.3 on September 13, 1971 to provide that no SAR would 
have more than 13 pages unless the assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) granted 
a special waiver; DoD preferred 10 pages or less.  In addition to the changes by DoD, the 
comptroller general also made some recommendations (Staats, 1973).   
The comptroller first published a number of recommendations in a report in 
February 6, 1970 entitled “Status of the Acquisition of Selected Major Weapon Systems.” 
The  report recognized that the system presented a meaningful management tool for 
measuring and tracking the progress of major acquisitions.  The office of the comptroller 
general did notice some serious shortcomings; they were missing: (1) a comparison of 
demonstrated performance with that specified in the contract, (2) the status of key 
subsystems essential to mission accomplishment (3) costs incurred in relationship to the 
costs planned to be incurred, (4) significant pending decisions that may affect the 
program, and (5) a comparison of quantities delivered with those scheduled to be 
delivered at the same time.   
The comptroller general made a second review of the SAR system in August 1970 
and published a report entitled “Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems” in 
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March 18, 1971.  The report confirmed that improvements had been made since DoD 
issued the first report, however the SAR needed additional improvements.  They 
concluded that SARs still did not: (1) contain a summary regarding overall acceptability 
of the weapon for its mission, (2) recognize the relationship of other weapon systems 
complementary to the system, or (3) reflect the status of programs (Staats, 1973).   
In August 1971, the comptroller general generated a third review of the SAR 
system, which focused on evaluating its value to management.  While DoD continued to 
improve the system, they identified two principal problems related to changing baselines 
for measuring progress and credibility of cost estimates.  The GAO concluded that static 
baselines should be reported and maintained in the SAR and that DoD programs need to 
make complete and realistic cost estimates.  The committee believed that both 
recommendations were essential in evaluating the progress of major acquisitions in 
making decisions on the systems future progress.  In addition, they noticed a recurring 
problem associated with the undue delay in submitting SARs to top management through 
DoD.  Another recurring problem concerned the limiting criteria for designating weapon 
systems far SAR reporting; it should be reassessed to improve management visibility on 
additional major weapon systems.  The GAO published these findings in a report entitled 
“Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems,”  July 17, 1972 (Staats, 1973).   
The report went on to mention GAO’s next significant report between February 
and March 1973.  The 1973 GAO report reviewed 68 staff studies to the Congress 
evaluating the SAR on applicable systems.  The document went on to outline the 
following five recommendations:  
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1.  Precise criteria should be established for adding and deleting major 
acquisitions.   
2.  Planning and development estimates that may change should not be deleted for 
any reason.  SARs should contain a record of all estimates so that there is total 
visibility and track-ability from the program’s inception.   
3.  Submitting SARs to top management through DoD are unduly delayed.  For 
several years, SARs have been submitted to Congress nearly three months after 
the "as of " dates.   
4.  All program costs should be included.  A number of systems under 
development include only research and development costs.  Procurement costs 
are excluded and costs for these systems are therefore understated in SARs.  
Also, other systems are kept below the dollar criteria for consideration for 
SARs.   
5.  SARs should show a comparison of costs incurred, schedule milestones 
attained, and technical performance accomplished with what was planned for 
the same period of time and costs budgeted (Staats, 1973).   
We include a summary table outlining the major changes associated with this 
document in Table 1.   
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Table 1. Summary Table of Letter to Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services (1973) 
Letter to Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services (1973) 
    Background History 
February 1968 - first authoritative guidance that 
established the mandatory SAR requirement 
(DoD instruction 7000.3) 
1968 - the DoD used the SAR in an experimen-
tal stage 
1969 - Secretary of Defense established an ob-
jective to be advised regularly on the status of 
major acquisitions 
1969 - SAR's will be used to advise top DoD 
management and the Congress of the progress 
of major acquisitions 
    House Committee on Armed Services   
April 24, 1970 - Report to Congress listed multi-
ple concerns associated with the SAR 
    DoD Improvements 
Enhanced definition of costs (flyaway costs, 
weapon system costs, procurement costs, and 
program acquisition costs) 
June 30, 1970 - Issued Weapon System Cost-
ing memorandum 
September 13, 1971 - Revised DoD instruction 
7000.3 to ensure that no SAR would have more 
than 13 pages 
    Comptroller General (makes three reviews) 
February 6, 1970 - Issued report called "Status 
of the Acquisition of Selected Major Weapon 
Systems" 
March 18, 1971- Issued report called 
"Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems" 
July 17, 1972 - issued report titled  "Acquisition 
of Major Weapon Systems" (concluded that 
static baselines should be reported and main-
tained in the SAR - Also Made 5 additional sig-
nificant reccomendations)  
1984 GAO Report to Congress 
The next document we find in our research, is a GAO report titled, “DoD Reports 
to the Congress Need More Realism," that makes several recommendations concerning 
the SAR.  One significant portion of this report was found in Chapter III.  Indeed, GAO 
voiced multiple concerns and made recommendations which we summarize here: 
• Some of the weapon system’s cost data reported to the Congress is not accurate, 
complete, or timely.  SARs did not always report the most current and accurate 
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program costs, sometimes reports contain costs inconsistently, and did not report 
operation and support costs.   
• Costs known to be part of systems requirements are not always included in the 
officially approved program for the system.   
• Congress introduced the unit cost exception report in 1982 because of their 
concern for the lack of currency of the cost data in the SARs.   
• An expanded requirement for DoD certification of the validity of its estimates 
may result in more complete cost reporting to Congress.   
With concerns outlined, GAO made the following recommendations: 
• SARs report all relevant program costs, use the most current data, and report costs 
in a consistent manner.  In the event of an exceptional situation where costs are 
excluded from the estimates, those costs should be clearly identified in the 
rationale for their explained exclusion.   
• Clear criteria should be established regarding the cost to be included in the 
officially approved program for a given weapon system.   
• DoD should disclose the total number of units it is considering for a program by 
providing a SAR footnote when the number is different from the approved 
program reported in the body of the SAR.   
• Unit cost exception reports should disclose any anticipated cost growth that has 
not been included in the latest officially approved estimate (Bowsher, 1984).   
1988 GAO Report to Congress 
In the GAO report to Congress in 1988 titled “MAJOR ACQUISITIONS: 
Summary of Recurring Problems and Systemic Issues: 1960-1987.”  It outlined years of 
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acquisition reform and concluded that significant change in acquisition progress since the 
60’s had not been realized.  The report did not significantly address SAR reporting but 
did mention that the SAR is where GAO acquired its data for analysis.  Appendix II.1 of 
the report mentions the number of problems associated with data reporting in Selected 
Acquisition Programs from 1980-1983 as 5 for 1980, 0 for 1981, 4 for 1982, and 3 for 
1983.  Although the report doesn’t specifically mention the SAR as being the culprit, one 
can reasonably assume that the SAR is directly involved with this problem (Wath, 1986).   
1989 GAO Report to Congress 
This report shows how DoD could substantially improve the quality, timeliness, 
and presentation of data it provides to Congress on its major system acquisitions.  The 
report focuses on three key areas: 
• Present the SARs in the same manner as the internal acquisition status reports 
(Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, DAES).   
• Enhance the presentation and usefulness of SAR data.   
• Improve SAR presentation of schedule data.   
With these three key areas identified, we further expound upon these starting with the 
first main point.   
In reference to DoD's internal acquisition reporting, GAO found that the DAES 
presented significant improvements over the SAR, for example the DAES contains: 
quarterly reporting, the use of a standard microcomputer-based model to generate the 
DAES reports that reflect “as of” data current to within 60 days, and contractor data to 
improve quality reporting.   
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In reference to enhancing the presentation and usefulness of SAR data, GAO 
found that DoD could further enhance the utility and arrangement of SAR data through 
use of automation and graphs.  GAO found that collectively SARs contain approximately 
2000 to 3000 pages of data and are only provided to Congress as a typed copy.  
Ultimately they believed that DoD could establish a single SAR database to allow 
Congressional oversight committees access to SAR data through their own personal 
computers.  DoD could format SAR data in such a way that congressional staff could 
query the system for key performance indicators relating to each acquisition program.   
The report also discussed other benefits of moving to computer technologies to aid in the 
timing and providing helpful graphics for data analysis.   
 In reference to the GAO comment on improving SAR presentation of schedule 
data, the report references an excerpt from the December 31, 1987 SAR report on the 
AMRAAM  program schedule.  As shown by Table 1.3 in their example, the program did 
not report the initial development estimates for low rate and full rate production phases 
for the AMRAAM, and did not calculate the actual schedule variances (Conahan, 1989).  
This report further emphasizes the recurring evolution of the SAR and the need for 
significant improvement in the vicinity of graphics and presentation.  With the 1989 
GAO report summarized, our next report further examines the SAR and prescribes 
noteworthy changes. 
 2005 GAO Report to Congress 
 This report is the most current evaluation that the GAO has performed in relation 
to the SAR.  The report focused on the following key areas which we expound upon in 
the proceeding paragraphs: 
 
16 
• Information for Congress on unit cost performance could be more complete.   
• Rebaselining can occur during each phase of acquisition, sometimes frequently on 
individual programs.   
• Year-to-year unit cost changes are not measured and reported.   
• In some cases, DoD reduces the magnitude of unit cost growth for Nunn -
McCurdy determinations.   
• Reporting of rebaselinings could be timelier and unclassified data is unnecessarily 
restricted.   
In reference to information for Congress on “unit cost performance could be more 
complete,” GAO believes that DoD could do better especially when it comes to program 
rebaselines.  GAO mentions a new baseline serves an important management control 
purpose when program goals are no longer achievable.  A new baseline also presents an 
important perspective on the program’s current status and acquisition strategy.  However, 
by comparing the latest unit cost estimate with the most recent approved baseline, DoD 
provides an incomplete perspective on program performance because a rebaseline 
shortens the period of performance reported and resets the measurement of cost growth to 
zero.  The SAR also does not present how unit cost growth is adjusted for Nunn-
McCurdy determinations when a rebaseline reduces the number of units to be procured or 
increases system capabilities.  For example, the GAO report highlighted four programs 
that emphasize the highest number of rebaselinings in Table 1 of their report: F/A-22 (14 
rebaselines), DDG  51 (11 rebaselines), SM-2 Block IV (11 rebaselines), SSN-21 (10 
rebaselines).  Of the 81 programs reported in 2003, 49 or (60%) had multiple 
rebaselinings over the life of the program.   
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Cumulative unit cost changes are also not measured and reported in constant 
dollars.  DoD reports to Congress on the unit cost growth of programs in two different 
sections of the SAR.  One section reports the current estimate against the latest approved 
baseline in both then-year and constant dollars.  However, because of rebaselining, the 
latest approved baseline may be in place for only a short time and the measurement of 
unit cost growth is reset to zero.  The other section reports the cumulative historical 
change only in then-year dollars, which includes the effects of inflation.  For example, 
Table 2 of the GAO report highlights six programs that failed to show cumulative 
changes to unit cost in constant dollars as compared from the latest APB to the original 
APB.  AMRAAM (87 to 254 months), AAWS-M  (Javelin) (34 to 174 months), FMTV 
(7 to177 months), USMC H-1 Upgrades (20 to 87 months), V-22 Vertical Lift Aircraft 
(20 to 212 months), and F/A-22 (4 to143 months).   
The report also mentions that year-to-year unit cost changes are not measured and 
reported.  For example, DoD does not measure and report changes in unit cost between 
the latest budget request and the prior budget.  Of the seven rebaselined programs 
between 2004 and 2005, DoD reset the cost growth for all of them to zero.  For example, 
the Stryker armored vehicle program reported a little over 1% unit cost growth in the two 
months since it rebaselined, but DoD did not report the significant fact that the program 
experienced a 20% growth between annual budget requests.  GAO highlighted four 
programs showing differences in the percentage in PAUC (program acquisition unit cost) 
from the calculation changes reported to Congress from the current estimate compared to 
the latest APB, which did get reported and the current estimate compared to the prior-
year estimate that did not get reported.  The report mentioned these following programs 
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in Table 4 of the report: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (2.78% to 
49.88%), F/A 22 Raptor (0% to 27.39%), Stryker (1.34% to 20.97%), and Force XXI 
Battle Command (0% to 72.79%).   
The GAO report also describes that in some cases, DoD reduces the magnitude of 
unit cost growth for Nunn-McCurdy determinations.  Congress established unit cost as 
the key measure of buying power compared to the average cost to buy each unit.  
Congress also established the Nunn-McCurdy cost increase thresholds of 15% and 25% 
for unit cost growth that require detailed reporting.  If quantities decrease but cost is the 
same or did not decrease proportionately, unit cost would necessarily increase.  When it 
comes to determining Nunn-McCurdy breaches, DoD allows for the exclusion of the unit 
cost increases associated with reductions in quantity or increases in capabilities on 
individual programs.  These actions are referred to as programmatic adjustments and 
require the approval of a new acquisition program baseline.  These adjustments allow 
DoD to reduce the number of the magnitude of unit cost increases reported to Congress 
that would otherwise exceed the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.  The effects of these 
adjustments are not explicitly visible in the reports to Congress.  For example, the GAO 
report showed in Table 5 that the Comanche Helicopter Program projected a unit cost of 
$31,275 as of the baseline and a projected quantity of 1,213.  The current estimate 
showed a unit cost of $50,621 and a projected quantity of 650 which is a 61.86 
percentage change.  The GAO report goes on to mention that if DoD had reported the 
adjustments for unit cost growth to account for reduced quantities or increased 
capabilities, the number of programs that would have had Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
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reported to Congress (between fiscal years 2001 and 2003) would have increased by 
roughly 50% (from 17 to 25 programs).   
The GAO report highlights another issue concerning the fact that reporting 
rebaselinings could be timelier and that DoD unnecessarily restricts unclassified data.  
DoD typically reports the latest program rebaselined information in its December SAR.  
Sometimes data can arrive for congressional consideration as much as 12 months after a 
program has rebaselined.  Between the April 2003 and the April 2004 SARs to Congress, 
DoD rebaselined nine programs and on average failed to report these rebaselines for six 
months.  Between 1996 and 2003, about two thirds of the rebaselines occurred between 
April and December.  A new baseline approved after early April may not be reported to 
Congress before the enactment of authorization and appropriations legislation.  The GAO 
report highlighted the DD (X) Destroyer program.  The report mentions that the program 
established a new baseline on the April 23, 2002, but did not report this new baseline to 
Congress in the SAR until April 2003.  As a result, between April 2002 and the passage 
of the fiscal year 2003 defense budget, the SAR provided to Congress did not reflect the 
approved baseline for the program.  Table 7 of the GAO report highlighted seven 
programs that had reporting lag time from eight to 12 months.   
In addition to problems with lag time, DoD unnecessarily classified SAR data.  
DoD classified about 50% of the SARs submitted to Congress in 2003, involving a total 
acquisition investment of $454 billion.  Astonishingly, only a small amount of data 
contained in each classified SAR is actually classified.  The classified material is 
generally only one of the 18 sections in a report which generally falls in the Performance 
Characteristics section.  Performance characteristics include such items as speed, range, 
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etc.  Because the SARs are classified, special handling procedures must be used by those 
congressional staff with the proper clearances access to the unclassified cost and schedule 
data.  This practice also completely blocks access for those staff without clearances to the 
unclassified cost and schedule data.  As a result, congressional oversight of DoD's 
adherence to establish cost and schedule baselines is unnecessarily constrained.   
With problems identified, the 2005 GAO report then made the following 
recommendations: 
• Measure and report a full history of unit cost performance in constant dollars by 
comparing the latest cost in quantity estimates with: the first full estimate 
(typically the original acquisition program baseline established at milestone B), 
the current approved baseline, or if the program rebaselines, the prior approved 
program baseline, and the estimate established with the previous year's budget 
request.   
• Fully disclose to Congress the nature and extent of programmatic adjustments 
affecting Nunn-McCurdy thresholds and terminations, pending any congressional 
direction on this issue.   
• Notify Congress when rebaselining actions are approved.   
• Separately report classified and unclassified SAR information (Levin, 2005).   
 We feel that the 2005 GAO report covers the most significant and current scrutiny 
that the SAR has undertaken to date.  GAO made several points of concern, which we 
summarize in Table 2 and then shift to the 1992 RAND study.   
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Table 2. 2005 GAO Report Problem/Solution Summary Table 
Problem Solution 
Information for Congress on unit cost perform-
ance could be more complete and Year-to-year 
unit cost changes are not measured and re-
ported. 
Measure and report a full history of unit cost 
performance in constant dollars by comparing 
the latest cost in quantity estimates with: the 
first full estimate (typically the original acqui-
sition program baseline established at mile-
stone B), the current approved baseline, or if 
the program rebaselines, the prior approved 
program baseline, and the estimate established 
with the previous year's budget request. 
Rebaselining can occur during each phase of 
acquisition, sometimes frequently on individual 
programs. N/A 
Reporting of rebaselinings could be timelier Notify Congress when rebaselining actions are 
approved.  
In some cases, DoD reduces the magnitude of 
unit cost growth for Nunn -McCurdy determi-
nations. 
Fully disclose to Congress the nature and ex-
tent of programmatic adjustments affecting 
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds and terminations, 
pending any congressional direction on this 
issue. 
Unclassified data is unnecessarily restricted. Separately report classified and unclassified 
SAR information.  
 Pitfalls in Calculating Cost Growth from Selected Acquisition Reports, 1992 
 RAND (1992) begins with the preface that highlights two primary prerequisites 
for researching the patterns and causes of cost growth, a reliable database and a 
consistent methodology for insuring the comparability of the data.  The study’s main 
objective concerned identifying the weaknesses of the database and how those 
weaknesses influence calculations of program cost growth.  This study provides an 
excellent background of the SAR and points out numerous difficulties with respect to the 
measurement of cost growth.  RAND found the following most notable problems areas: 
• Failure of some programs to use a consistent baseline cost estimate.   
• Exclusion of some significant elements of cost.   
• Exclusion of certain classes of major programs (e.g., special access programs).   
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• Constantly changing preparation guidelines.   
• Inconsistent interpretation of preparation guidelines across programs.   
• Cost sharing in joint programs.   
 RAND (1992) also looked at the baseline problem, more specifically which 
baseline to use.  The study pointed out that the originally chosen baseline may not be as 
stable as first thought.  This study cited two primary reasons.  First, baseline estimates are 
occasionally updated subsequent to their creation.  Second, once evolutionary model 
changes are introduced, the baseline may reflect a work scope far different from the 
current one (Hough, 1992).  It appears that RAND shows some concern in the area of a 
revolving baseline and this could present a serious problem when trying to standardize 
schedule milestones across multiple programs by only looking at the most current SAR.   
 RAND goes on to talk about the changing development estimate (DE).  RAND 
discusses the importance of planning, development, and production estimates for the 
same program and emphasizes that the development estimate is the most frequently used 
baseline in the SAR.  RAND states that although the changing of the development 
estimate is not common, it sometimes happens and the analyst must be careful in 
selecting the correct baseline date.  RAND mentions that as a general rule, once a 
baseline has been selected, the first estimate presented as the baseline should be used for 
calculations of cost growth.  RAND (1992) cited multiple examples to support their view, 
one of which was the Bradley fighting vehicle system.  The Mechanized Infantry Combat 
Vehicle (MICV) preceded the Bradley fighting vehicle.  Subsequently, DoD combined 
the MICV with the Bradley fighting vehicle as two separate programs within one SAR, 
hence the development estimate’s accuracy is questionable.  The schedule date problem 
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basically demonstrates how a service can take a canceled or restructured program, often 
for poor cost performance, and then breathe life into the program and take the 
opportunity to update the development estimate.  RAND also believes that the 
development estimate occasionally is changed in a manner that puts the program in a 
more favorable light and sometimes changes are not made when they should.   
 Evolutionary model changes also concerned RAND.  They emphasize that 
successful systems such as the F-15 or F-16 fighter aircraft realized quantities that have 
been greatly increased, and perhaps more importantly, the configuration has been 
modified so much that current models only remotely resemble originally planned 
estimates.  For example, the study highlights the F-15E models currently in production at 
the time of this study are still reported in the SAR against the F-15A development 
estimate.  RAND (1992) also further emphasizes that since improvements at current 
stages may only later be packaged as a new model.  Therefore, the costs associated with 
evolutionary changes are difficult and often impossible to extract from SARs.   
 The RAND study also points out a related problem that occurs when baseline 
estimates and CEs (current estimates) are based upon an inconsistent program definition.  
The GAO has found cases over time where DoD program managers developed program 
estimates from differing work breakdown structures and therefore could not be 
comparable.  RAND emphasizes that this is a great example of why research that places 
blind faith in the most current SAR, without examining program histories and making 
appropriate adjustments, can lead to bias results in flawed conclusions.   
 The report also reflects that contractor-borne expenses also pose an area for 
inconsistency.  Because the SAR only includes the estimated cost to the government and 
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not total investment costs, true cost growth is underestimated depending on how much 
the contractor must contribute.  RAND (1992) believes that this can generally happen in 
one of two ways.  One way is when cost overrun occurs on a firm fixed-price or fixed-
price incentive contract.  Costs above the ceiling price are borne entirely by the 
contractor and therefore, are not reflected in SAR estimates of total procurement cost.  
The second way is when contractors use their own funds to improve R&D efforts.   
 The RAND study mentions another potential pitfall which pertains to incomplete 
data and the evolution of the SAR database.  RAND states that typically, studies are 
based on data contained in the active SARs as of December of a given year.  The study 
emphasizes that exclusion of inactive SARs without systematic rationale may lead to 
biased results that may not reflect current procurement policy.  RAND believes that cost 
growth should identify what portion of the total SAR population is included and why the 
sample is representative of the whole is satisfactory for meeting the study objectives.  
There are also numerous programs that are not even reported in the SAR database due to 
the sensitive and classified nature of these top-secret programs like the F-117A Stealth 
Fighter.  RAND (1992) mentions of these black programs protect advanced technology in 
reference to our national security, but they also prevent the public eye at program costs.   
 Another area of apprehension to RAND concerns the historical changes in SAR 
preparation guidelines.  RAND further states that there are too many changes to identify 
in this report but highlights the most common changes up to 1992.  We include them in 
Table 3.   
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Table 3. (RAND) Summary Table of Most Common Changes to SAR up to 1992 
Most Common Changes to SAR up to 1992 
(RAND) 
Reporting in base year and current dollars 
Changes in threshold for SAR reporting 
Reduced frequency of reporting (quarterly to 
annual) 
Escalation of prior-year actuals to base-year 
dollars 
Inclusion of production estimates for baseline 
Change in the selection of base year from the 
first year of funding to the fiscal year of the 
development estimate (DE) 
Addition of program cost-quantity data 
Use of the baseline cost-quantity relationship 
to calculate quantity-cost variances 
Reduction from nine to seven cost-variance 
categories  
 The RAND (1992) study further emphasizes that many of these changes are not 
significant in estimating cost growth and may even simplify the process; however, some 
of the changes have distinct and subtle effects.  For example, RAND mentions that before 
1984, the development estimates in base-year dollars often include actual dollars.  In fact, 
one program’s expenditure preceded the base-year of the development estimate.  In 1984, 
administration changed the rules so that earlier actuals, if any, would be inflated to the 
base-year of the development estimate.  Other changes became more critical, like the 
guidelines intended for quantity changes to be calculated based on the original cost-
quantity curve.  Many programs based their current unit prices on quantity variance 
calculations until December 1979 when the office of the Secretary of Defense increased 
manning for review of SARs.  The study also finds it interesting that DoD had not 
fashioned a guide for the preparation and review of SARs until May 1980.  The author of 
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the RAND report believes, that although that many of changes appear to be minor, it 
reinforces the caution against temporal comparisons. 
Along with changes in guidance is the problem with inconsistent preparation 
techniques.  RAND (1992) mentions that inconsistencies may result from deliberate 
manipulation of the data as though it came from unintentional errors.  Even though the 
RAND study does not cite specific examples in this particular analysis, RAND states that 
there is sufficient evidence available to suggest that certain programs under pressure may 
resort to liberal interpretations of the reporting instructions or, as RAND calls it, 
“creative financing” to reduce the apparent cost growth.  The study cites two general 
possibilities for creative financing.  One possibility is shifting costs between 
appropriations (R&D and procurement) and between fiscal years to take advantage of 
lower escalation rights.  Another possibility is to make unrealistic cost improvement 
assumptions for out-year production lots to avoid a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breech.  
RAND believes that this type of activity is not ubiquitous; but it would be youthful to 
deny that it exists.   
Cost sharing in joint programs is another area of concern.  The RAND (1992) 
states that when two or more services spend money in a joint program, SARs for the 
individual services can either be arbitrarily broken out or can be split in such a way that 
one service absorbs the fixed costs of production.  The study mentions that the situation is 
most common in the case of air-to-air missiles used by both Air Force and Navy fighters.  
When individual service cost growth factors are calculated, the actual performance of the 
program may be distorted.  The author further states that usually the lead service absorbs 
most of the cost growth in a program because it funds the majority of R&D.   
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RAND concludes that although there are numerous problems with the SAR, many 
of these concerns may be addressed through careful research and analysis.  RAND 
believes that the SAR is still useful for capturing broad-based trends in temporal patterns.  
However, the conclusions drawn from a high-level analysis must be tempered by the 
weaknesses found in the data (Hough, 1992).  Since we describe this report in great 
detail, we include a summary table (Table 4) for clarity of what RAND considers the 
SAR’s most notable problems as of 1992 and then we review DOD guidance.   
Table 4. (RAND) Summary Table of the SAR's Most Notable Problems up to 1992 
(RAND) Summary Table of the SAR's Most Notable 
Problems up to 1992  
Failure of some programs to use a consistent 
baseline cost estimate 
Exclusion of some significant elements of 
cost 
Exclusion of certain classes of major pro-
grams (e.g., special access programs) 
Constantly changing preparation guidelines 
Inconsistent interpretation of preparation 
guidelines across programs 
Cost sharing in joint programs  
DoD Instruction 5000.2 
The first DoD instruction that we review lays the foundation for the acquisition 
model.  It also outlines key players and responsibilities in the acquisition process.  In fact, 
the Program Management enclosure takes up a primary portion of this instruction.  This 
particular enclosure defines the key responsibilities of the Program Manager (PM) and 
Program Executive Officer (PEO).  The instruction mentions that a Program Manager 
shall be designated for each acquisition program.  DoD shall designate the PM and PEO 
no later than program initiation.  The instruction goes on to state that a Program Manager 
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shall serve in the position for four years in accordance with the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act.  The PM shall be given budget and guidance in a written 
charter of his or her authority, responsibility, and accountability for accomplishing 
approved program objectives.  Unless a waiver is granted, a PEO shall be assigned 
acquisition program responsibilities.  The PEO shall be dedicated to executive 
management and shall not have other command responsibilities (DoD, 2003b).  With our 
first instruction reviewed, we transition to DoD directive 5000.1. 
 DoD Directive 5000.1 
This particular directive is the bedrock for the Defense Acquisition System.  It outlines 
key leadership hierarchy and their responsibility; defines pertinent terms and 
methodology; and directs personnel oversight.  The significant portion of this directive is 
again, the assignment of the program manager (PM) and the overarching duties of that 
assignment.  In this directive, the “Total Systems Approach” is defined by emphasizing 
that the PM shall be the single point of accountability for accomplishing program 
objectives for total life-cycle systems management, including sustainment (DoD, 2003a).   
DoD 5000.2-R 
This particular regulation goes into great detail in relation to most aspects of the 
acquisition process.  One area of significance is associated with the Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB).  The guidance states that every acquisition program shall establish an 
APB beginning at program initiation.  The PM shall base the APB on user’s performance 
requirements, schedule requirements, and estimate of total program cost.  Performance 
shall include interoperability, supportability, and as applicable, environmental 
requirements.  The APB is part of the Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System 
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(CARS).  The PM is responsible for using the CARS to prepare the APB.  In other words, 
the APB is where all the baseline schedule dates are estimated.  A very interesting note is 
in the area of schedule dates in reference to the APB.  The regulation states that schedule 
parameters should minimally include dates for program initiation, major decision points, 
and the attainment of initial operating capability (IOC).  The PM may also propose for 
milestone decision authority approval, or other specific, critical system events as 
necessary.  This particular area causes some concern because this research focuses on 
why all SAR reports in the Monaco (2005) database are missing multiple schedule dates.  
This guidance suggests that all programs do not need to report those dates but only need 
to report the previously described minimum schedule dates.   
The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) portion is another significant area of this 
regulation.  In accordance with 10 U. S. C. 2432, the PM shall submit a SAR to Congress 
for all ACAT I programs.  The SAR is required to report the status of total program cost, 
schedule, and performance; as well as program unit cost and unit cost breech information.  
The regulation goes on to state that each SAR shall include a full life cycle cost analysis 
for the reporting program, each of its evolutionary blocks, as available, and for its 
predecessor program, if applicable.  The regulation also states that the SAR for the 
quarter ending December 31 shall be called the annual SAR.  The PM is required to 
submit the annual SAR within 60 days after the president submits the following fiscal 
year’s budget to Congress.  Annual SARs are required to reflect the president's budget in 
supporting documentation.  Quarterly SARs are submitted on an exception basis for the 
following reasons: (1) the current estimate exceeds the Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
(PAUC) objective or the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) objective of the 
 
30 
currently approved APB, both in base-year dollars, by 15% or more; (2) the current 
estimate includes a six-month or greater delay, for any schedule parameter, that occurred 
since the current estimate reported in the previous SAR; or (3) milestone B or milestone 
C approval occurs within the reportable quarter.   
The Secretary of Defense may also waive the requirement for submission of 
SARs for a program for a fiscal year if: (1) the program has not entered system 
development and demonstration; (2) a reasonable cost estimate has not been established 
for the program; (3) or the system configuration for the program is not well defined.  This 
particular portion is of importance and explains why some programs have multiple SARs 
for a particular fiscal year and some programs only have one.  It's noteworthy to mention 
that this piece of information explains why some programs are missing SAR reports for a 
given fiscal year.   
Similar to the SAR is the Defense acquisition executive summary (DAES).  The 
DAES is a multi-part document, reporting program information and assessments; PM, 
PEO (program executive officer), CAE (component acquisition executive) comments; 
and cost and funding data.  The DAES is designed to be an early warning report to 
USD(AT&L) and ASD(C3I).  The DAES describes actual program problems, warns of 
potential program problems, and describes mitigating actions taken.  At a minimum, the 
DAES are for program assessments, unit costs, and current estimates.  It's also reports the 
status of exit criteria and vulnerability assessments.  The DAES shall also present total 
cost and quantities for all years, as projected, through the end of the current acquisition 
phase.  The regulation also states USD shall designate which ACAT I programs shall be 
reported using the DAES and assign each program a quarterly reporting group.  The PM 
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uses the CARS to prepare the DAES estimate and must provide both hard and electronic 
copies to USD(AT&L) by the last working day of the program’s designated quarterly 
reporting month.  It's noteworthy to mention that the DAES is an internal document to the 
undersecretary of Defense and not directly reportable to Congress.   
Another significant portion of this regulation is associated with the Consolidated 
Acquisition Reporting System (CARS).  CARS is the personal computer-based data entry 
and reporting software package.  It maintains and reports information on Defense 
programs.  CARS is mandatory requirement for all MDAPs and MAIS (Major automated 
information systems) programs, but non-MDAP and non-MAIS program may still use the 
system.  CARS has three reporting modules: the APB, the SAR, and the DAES.  CARS 
includes analysis routines, such as the Computational Module that supports the SAR cost 
change calculations, and SAR and DAES data checks.  The Director, Acquisition 
Resources and Analysis, maintains a CARS helpline for user support.  A unique program 
number (PNO) identification system controls the use of CARS.  The office of 
USD(AT&L) is the focal point that assigns a PNO to each using ACAT I program.   
The CARS software specifies the format of the APB, SAR, and DAES, except for 
narrative or memo type information.  The three reporting modules share some, but not all, 
of the CARS data.  For example, the DAES and the SAR report the APB.  The modules 
also share some contract information.  The CARS software also includes instructions for 
preparing the APB (acquisition program baseline), SAR, DAES, and UCR (unit cost 
reporting), including administrative procedures.  This last piece of information 
concerning SAR, DAES, and CARS has a significant impact on this research because the 
SAR and DAES get their data directly from the CARS which is inputted by the PM.   
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 In summary to this regulation, we find some significant nuggets of information.  
First, DoD only requires PMs to minimally include schedule dates for program initiation, 
major decision points, and the attainment of initial operating capability (IOC).  This 
subjective statement answers one of our research objectives e.g.  Why are programs 
missing data in their respective SAR? Hence, they are really not missing all the schedule 
dates mentioned in Chapter I, like FUE for example, because the PMs are not required to 
provide them.  Second, the Secretary of Defense may also waive the requirement for 
submission of SARs for a program for a fiscal year which explains why some programs 
are missing SARs for a given date.  And Lastly, SAR and DAES get their data directly 
from the CARS which is inputted by the PM, which leads us to believe that we cannot 
extract more schedule data from the systems other than what we already have in the SAR 
(DoD, 2001).  The next form of guidance we review is the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook. 
 Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is a 520 page document that the Defense 
Acquisition University maintains.  This large document's purpose is to assist the 
acquisition workforce in using and understanding the DoD acquisition policies and the 
guidance associated with those policies.  Its general goal is to provide members of the 
acquisition community and their industry partners with an interactive, on-line reference to 
policy and discretionary best practices.  This document may be redundant in that it 
duplicates information from 5000.1 and 5000.2 but it also expands upon the regulations 
and clarifies common discrepancies.  Since it is an online document, the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook adapts to change faster than conventional policy (DAU, 2004).  
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With the guidebook highlighted, we progress to other pertinent sources of information 
associated with the SAR, such as the CARS web site. 
Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System (CARS) web site 
Due to the rapid change the acquisition system has undergone, there is no 
centrally published information on CARS that is thorough enough to stand on its own.  
Therefore, this research turns to the CARS DoD sponsored web page to enhance our 
literature review.  CARS, as described before, is a personal computer-based data entry 
and reporting System combining common and unique Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES) and Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), and Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB) components into a unified repository from which DAES and SAR reports 
and APB documents can be printed.  CARS leadership designed the system to do the 
following: 
• Reduce field workload for preparation of Baseline, DAES, and SAR reports.  
• Generate standardized, automated project status information for use by the 
Program Manager, Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), and Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE) staffs. 
• Provide more timely and accurate analytical tools for Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the military 
services. 
• Improve acquisition data management. 
• Establish acquisition-wide software, data, and documentation standards (Flaharty, 
2005).  From the CARS web site, we find some very useful information in the 
CARS User Guide. 
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 CARS User Guide, Oct 2005 
Although the user Guide is not doctrine, it is published guidance from the CARS 
web site that directly describes how each component in the SAR is derived.  Since it is 
the most complete document pertaining to how a SAR is created, this research deems it 
noteworthy to appraise.  The first interesting feature concerns the “points of contact.”  
The manual provides information that is not just for technical support.  There is also 
contact information for MDAP, MAIS, DAES, and SAR functional support POCs.  The 
next significant portion of the guide focuses on the components of the program.  The 
program is set up in a modular structure that consists of four modules: Baseline, DAES, 
SAR, and Budget which we describe in the proceeding paragraphs.   
The baseline module describes in detail how baseline dates are presented in the 
SAR, which is why it is of interest to this thesis.  For example, all milestones come from 
approved schedule milestones included on the baseline disk as provided by the Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE) or the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE).   
The SAR module contains the most comprehensive information on the SAR 
found thus far.  The SAR background section also presented a very comprehensive 
summary of the most comprehensive policy changes that have occurred since the 
inception of the SAR.  After the SARs inception in 1969, in 1975 the FY 1976/7T 
Authorization Act established the SAR as a legislative reporting requirement to be 
submitted to Congress.  Over the past three decades, the SAR has changed several times.  
In 1983, a SAR Improvement Task Force significantly reduced the contents of the SAR.  
In 1985, the FY 86 Authorization Act restored the information that had been removed 
and added production to aid in operating and support cost information.  The FY 87 
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Authorization Act provided for limited reporting for Pre-milestone B (formally milestone 
II) programs and relaxed some reporting criteria.  The FY 1990 Authorization Act 
merged the Unit Cost Exception Report (UCR) with the SAR and eliminated separate 
unit cost exception reporting.   
In continuing with regulatory actions to the SAR, The FY 92 Authorization Act 
gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to waive selected acquisition reporting for 
certain programs.  The act also allowed the Secretary of Defense to change the content of 
the SAR as long the SECDEF notified the appropriate House and Senate committees in 
advance.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 changed the baseline for unit 
cost reporting purposes from the prior President's budget to the approved acquisition 
program baseline (APB) and substituted the “procurement unit cost" for the current 
“year” procurement unit cost.  In 1996, DoD made additional changes in SAR format and 
content which reduced the volume of the SAR by about 20 to 30%.  The development of 
CARS proved to be a very significant change in the preparation of the SAR.  Since 
CARS infancy stage in 1990, it provided a standardized, automated system for generating 
the SAR.   
The SAR baseline segment is another comprehensive area of the SAR module in 
CARS.  This section discusses the types of baseline estimates and also explicitly covers 
SAR baseline changes.  SAR baselining (SAR baseline, baseline performance 
characteristics, schedule milestones, and cost estimates) are established for the initial 
SAR.  Depending on the phase of the acquisition cycle and the time the initial SAR is 
submitted, the baseline values are represented by a Planning Estimate (PE), a 
Development Estimate (DE), or a Production Estimate (PdE).   
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The document goes on to mention that baselines are changed (e.g. from PE to DE 
or DE to PdE) at major milestone decision points after review and approval by the 
USD(AT&L).  An APB is reflected in the SAR up to and including the first time a DE is 
approved as the SAR baseline at milestone II (now Milestone B).  A DE is reflected in 
the SAR up to and including the first time a PdE is approved as the SAR baseline at 
milestone III (now Milestone C).  SAR baselining is a two-step process.  The first step is 
the submission of a SAR which shows the old SAR baseline with the new SAR baseline 
being reported in the approved program (APB); this SAR is usually called the 
“transition” SAR.  The second step is the submission of a SAR that shows the new SAR 
baseline in the SAR baseline column (OSD, 2005b).  This section seems to suggest that 
the SAR baseline can change, depending on when each estimate is submitted.  With a 
comprehensive look at CARS, we feel it necessary to include a summary table of the 
major changes noted in the SAR since its inception (See Table 5)  Following the 
summary table, we move our review to the Ostrich/English Dictionary.   
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Table 5. CARS Summary Table of Significant Changes to the SAR (Mainly Congressional) 
CARS Summary Table of Significant Changes to the SAR 
1969 SARs Inception 
1975 
1975 the FY 1976/7T Authorization Act established 
the SAR as a legislative reporting requirement to be 
submitted to Congress 
1983 
SAR Improvement Task Force significantly reduced 
the contents of the SAR 
1985 
FY 86 Authorization Act restored the informa-
tion that had been removed and added produc-
tion to aid in operating and support cost infor-
mation 
1986 
The FY 87 Authorization Act provided for limited 
reporting for Pre-milestone B (formally milestone II) 
programs and relaxed some reporting criteria 
1989 
The FY 1990 Authorization Act merged the Unit 
Cost Exception Report (UCR) with the SAR and 
eliminated separate unit cost exception reporting 
1991 
The FY 92 Authorization Act gave the Secretary of 
Defense the authority to waive selected acquisition 
reporting for certain programs; also allowed the 
Secretary of Defense to change the content of the 
SAR as long he notified the appropriate House and 
1994 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 changed the baseline for unit cost report-
ing purposes from the prior President's budget 
to the approved acquisition program baseline 
(APB) and substituted the “procurement unit 
cost" for the current “year” procurement unit 
cost 
1996 
The Department made additional changes in SAR 
format and content which reduced the volume of 
the SAR by about 20 to 30%  
1996 
CARS system is created and is mandatory for 
all SAR preparation 
 
 Ostrich/English Dictionary, 2005 
The Ostrich/English Dictionary is a document that describes the Ostrich database.  
The Ostrich database is the database that the CARS system partially feeds into.  It is also 
the database that the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMIR) uses.  Oracle 
software created the database but it is designed so that it works with the CARS software 
 
38 
which is a legacy program.  Therefore, the files contained in this database are not 
normalized and cannot be used in the typical robust fashion that a relational database is 
designed to perform.  Mata-Toledo and Cushman (2000) state that normalization (of a 
database) is an objective criteria based upon the analysis of the relations, their schemes, 
their primary keys and how their functional dependencies are standardized.  This 
evolutionary process is described as levels of normalization from first normal form (1NF) 
to fifth normal form (5NF).  The objectives for a normalization process are to: (1) make it 
feasible to represent any relation in the database, (2) obtain powerful retrieval algorithms 
based on a collection of primitive relational operators, (3) free relations from undesirable 
insertion, update, and deletion anomalies, and (4) reduce the need for restructuring the 
relations as new data types are introduced (Mata-Toledo et al., 2000).  It is noteworthy to 
mention that if the programmer normalized the database in at least 3NF, the data could be 
used in an almost unlimited fashion to perform queries that would be highly useful to the 
analyst.  Currently, the data must be programmed so that it may be functional with web-
based applications.  This type of programming takes a great deal of time and cannot be 
reproduced from the raw database (Rosenberger, 2005).   
 Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), 2005 
DoD officially released DAMIR in March 2005 and provided right of entry to 
Congress in April 2005.  Congress finally has limited electronic access to Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) data.  DAMIR is a DoD initiative to provide enterprise 
accessibility to acquisition program information.  The primary goal of DAMIR is to 
streamline acquisition management and oversight by taking advantage of the capabilities 
of a web based environment.  DoD describes DAMIR’s purpose to identify the various 
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data sources the acquisition community uses to manage Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) programs and 
provide a unified web-based interface through which to present that information.  
DAMIR allows for visibility of the aforementioned programs by OSD, Military Services, 
Congress and other participating communities.  Now they can have access to information 
relevant to their missions regardless of the agency or where the data is located.  DAMIR 
is slated to evolve in such a way that its components are to replace the need for the legacy 
Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System (CARS).  The current DAMIR capability 
consists of two major web-based components: Purview and the Virtual Library.   
Purview is an executive information system that displays program information 
such as mission and description, cost, funding, and schedule data.  DoD developed the 
DAMIR initiative to provide a comprehensive view of the current state of all MDAP and 
MAIS programs.  Purview is the presentation layer for structured data currently collected 
in CARS.  It continues to be the solution for structured acquisition data presentation as 
the DAMIR initiative moves forward, and web services begin pulling this information 
directly from the service acquisition databases (USD, 2005). 
The establishment of purview has dramatically improved information access but 
there are also some limitations.  The major benefit of Purview to the researcher is that the 
data is centrally located via the web and can be reviewed separate from a secure area 
which is a significant step up from the current way of extracting the data.  The current 
method entails acquiring a secret security clearance and authorization to a DoD secured 
area.  Once access to a secured area, the researcher may review the Adobe Acrobat files 
on CD-ROM and then print the pertinent files (assuming the secure area possesses a 
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printer).  Then the security manager reviews the documents for potential classified data 
and finally the data is keyed by hand into a database.   
The ability to print the unclassified portions of SAR reports from one’s current 
personal computer is another benefit with Purview.  Although access improvements are 
realized with this system, there are some limitations.  One limitation is that all the data 
viewed on the web can only be reviewed or printed.  There is not an easy way to capture 
the data and convert it to a flat file for analysis.  The inability to directly download the 
data can be understood because of the data structure that the web component uses.  The 
Ostrich database is the database that the web component uses which has not been 
normalized into third normal form due to the limitations of the CARS legacy software.  
Another significant limitation is that the SAR reports in the system date back only to 
1997.  Any SAR reports that are older than 1997 still need to be accessed via the 
classified SAR CD-ROMs.   
The second component of DAMIR is the Virtual Library.  The Virtual Library is a 
search tool for unstructured data discovery.  The programming team, realizing that a 
typical search engine cannot find all the necessary information the acquisition community 
needs, created this search discovery tool to find information stored in various formats.  
Some examples of such formats are MS Word documents, or “.pdf” files, and also other 
incongruent sources, like Oracle databases, file servers and web servers (USD, 2005). 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, we review a plethora of historical documents that dissect 
acquisition reporting from many different angles.  It is from this information where we 
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derive the answers to many of our research objectives associated with the multiple 
missing schedule dates from the Monaco database (derived from the SAR for its 
information).   
 First, DoD only requires PMs to minimally include schedule dates for program 
initiation, major decision points, and the attainment of initial operating capability (IOC).  
This subjective statement answers one of our research objectives e.g.  Why are programs 
missing data in their respective SAR? Hence, they are not missing all the schedule dates 
mentioned in Chapter I, like FUE for example, because the PMs are not required to 
provide them.   
 Second, the Secretary of Defense may also waive the requirement for submission 
of SARs for a program for a fiscal year which explains why some programs are missing 
SARs for a given date.  And Lastly, SAR and DAES get their data directly from the 
CARS which is inputted by the PM, which leads us to believe that we cannot extract 
more schedule data from the systems other than what we already have in the SAR.   
 Third, there appears to be no other central repository for reporting the 
performance of MDAP programs.  Indeed, there is only one vector for historical analysis 
of MDAP reporting based on this literature review, the SAR.  This exhaustive search 
tentatively answers another one of our research objectives Is there any other 
comprehensive data sources for acquisition reporting other than the SAR?  We expound 
upon this research objective in the next chapter.   
 Fourth, each MDAP is not required to use identical baseline schedule variables.  It 
is very difficult to use schedule milestone data for statistical analysis with so much flux 
and variance between each MDAP, particularly in the area of changing baselines which 
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leads us to focus a large portion of our effort on this in Chapter III.  Indeed, we take a 
hard look in the area of baselines amongst various MDAPs to see if this affects the 
Monaco (2005) model.  One way we accomplish this is by adding the variable called “# 
of Rebaselines” which we describe in the next chapter.   
 Finally, the SAR has undergone rapid evolutionary changes from its infancy in 
the late sixties.  As mentioned in various reports, these changes directly affect the data 
when analyzed across 30 years.  Indeed, to fully realize the historical flux of the SAR, we 
close this chapter with two abridged summary tables to recap three decades of change to 
the SAR (See Table 6 & Table 7).  We also include a table that summarizes the system 
evolution of SAR based acquisition in Table 8. 
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Table 6. Significant Historical Literature Summary of the SAR (Part I) 
Significant Historical Literature Summary of the SAR (Part I) 
1973 Letter to Chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services   
 (Background  History) 
February 1968 - first authoritative guidance that established 
the mandatory SAR requirement (DOD instruction 7000.3) 
1968 - the DoD used the SAR in an experimental stage 
1969 - Secretary of Defense established an objective to be 
advised regularly on the status of major acquisitions 
1969 - SAR's will be used to advise top DOD management 
and the Congress of the progress of major acquisitions 
(House Committee on Armed Services )  
April 24, 1970 - Report to Congress listed multiple concerns 
associated with the SAR 
Enhanced definition of costs (flyaway costs, weapon sys-
tem costs, procurement costs, and program acquisition 
costs) 
June 30, 1970 - Issued Weapon System Costing memoran-
dum 
September 13, 1971 - Revised DOD instruction 7000.3 to 
ensure that no SAR would have more than 13 pages 
(Comptroller General makes three re-
views) 
February 6, 1970 - Issued report called "Status of the Ac-
quisition of Selected Major Weapon Systems" 
March 18, 1971- Issued report called "Acquisition of Major 
Weapon Systems" 
July 17, 1972 - issued report titled  "Acquisition of Major 
Weapon Systems" (concluded that static baselines should 
be reported and maintained in the SAR - Also Made 5 addi-
tional significant reccomendations) 
1984 GAO Report - Most Current Problems 
Some of the weapon system’s cost data reported to the 
Congress is not accurate, complete, or timely.  SARs did 
not always report the most currently anticipated program 
costs, sometimes reports contain costs inconsistently, and 
did not report operation and support costs 
Costs known to be part of systems requirements are not 
always included in the officially approved program for the 
system 
Congress introduced the unit cost exception report in 1982 
because of their concern for the lack of currency of the 
Cost data in the SARs 
An expanded requirement for DoD certification of the valid-
ity of its estimates may result in more complete cost report-
ing to the Congress 
1989 GAO - Most Current Problems 
Present the SARs in the same manner as the internal 
acquisition status reports (Defense Acquisition Execu-
tive Summary, DAES) 
Enhance the presentation and usefulness of SAR data.  





Table 7. Significant Historical Literature Summary of the SAR (Part II) 
Significant Historical Literature Summary (Part II) 
RAND Identifies Evolutionary Changes up to 1992 
Reporting in base year and current dollars 
Changes in threshold for SAR reporting 
Reduced frequency of reporting (quarterly to an-
nual) 
Escalation of prior-year actuals to base-year dollars 
Inclusion of production estimates for baseline 
Change in the selection of base year from the first 
year of funding to the fiscal year of the development 
estimate (DE) 
Addition of program cost-quantity data 
Use of the baseline cost-quantity relationship to cal-
culate quantity-cost variances 
Reduction from nine to seven cost-variance catego-
ries 
RAND Identifies Common Problems up to 1992 
Failure of some programs to use a consistent base-
line cost estimate 
Exclusion of some significant elements of cost 
Exclusion of certain classes of major programs 
(e.g., special access programs) 
Constantly changing preparation guidelines 
Inconsistent interpretation of preparation guide-
lines across programs 
Cost sharing in joint programs 
2005 GAO Report - Most Current Problems 
Information for Congress on unit cost performance 
could be more complete and Year-to-year unit cost 
changes are not measured and reported. 
Rebaselining can occur during each phase of ac-
quisition, sometimes frequently on individual pro-
grams 
Reporting of rebaselinings could be timelier 
In some cases, DoD reduces the magnitude of unit 
cost growth for Nunn -McCurdy determinations 




Table 8. Summary Table of Historical System Changes to the SAR 
Summary Table of System Changes to the SAR 
1968-69 SAR’s Inception (Paper Copies) 
1989 The Inception of DAES 
1990 
CARS is created/required as a report-
ing tool 
1990 
Data associated with CARS is segre-
gated into three database (SAR, 
DAES, APB) 
1996 
The Department made additional 
changes in SAR format and content 
which reduced the volume of the SAR 
by about 20 to 30%  
March 2005 
DoD officially released DAMIR 
(Available Programs = 1997 to Pre-
sent) 
April   2005 
DoD allows congress access to se-
lected data in DAMIR   
     (Knoche, 2006) 
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III.  Methodology 
Introduction  
 This chapter outlines the procedures that we use to conduct this research.  The 
research in this chapter begins with a search for missing schedule variables from the 
Monaco (2005) database using the literature results as a template.  From our search for 
missing variables, we incorporate a new variable that was realized from the literature 
review.  We then review the data source that has been used by prior researchers and how 
we incorporate the new variable into our model.  This research also reviews the 
methodology that has been used by prior research in this vein of study.  Lastly, we 
explain the use of response and predictor variables along with preliminary data analysis.   
Search for Missing Variables Associated with Schedule Slippage  
 This research from the literature review realized that filling in missing schedule 
dates for MDAPs using the SAR is futile because each program had varied schedule dates 
and each MDAP is not required to report the missing dates that are mentioned in the 
Monaco (2005) thesis.  Dates like First Unit Equipped (FUE), Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), Production Contract Award (PCA), Critical Design Review (CDR), and 
EMD Contract Award are not mandatory requirements (DoD, 2001).  Also, as this 
research combed over hundreds of SARs, we find that the schedule date called FUE, is 
primarily an Army term and is not present in Air Force programs other than joint 
ventures (DAU, 1999).  This point is significant because the Monaco (2005) and Moore 
(2003) models showed much promise in the area of predictability using FUE.  Also, it is 
noteworthy to mention that some of the researched historic SARs contained a small 
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amount of the missing dates, however, the dates are classified and therefore unable to be 
reported.  The DAES also proved to be unfruitful to fill in the holes because the program 
schedule dates for the SAR and the DAES for each program shows an identical match, 
hence if the SAR does not have a schedule date, neither does the DAES.  The DAMIR 
system also does not prove useful to fill in the missing schedule dates because the 
DAMIR pulls its data from the same place that the SAR and DAES get their data from, 
the CARS.  Also, as mentioned previously in Chapter II, the database for SAR and DAES 
only date back to 1997.  We can only find the data in paper copies of the SAR prior to 
1997.   
 Since the SAR, DAES, and DAMIR do not provide any venues to fill in the gaps 
in the Monaco (2005) database, this research looks for other avenues to fill in the missing 
dates which are highlighted in the proceeding paragraphs.  However, this research does 
not find any other plausible databases or systems that could alleviate the missing 
information dilemma.   
 This research continues by taking a closer look at the SAR to see if the GAO is 
correct in their assessment of the SAR.  This research evaluated hundreds of SARs and 
we find the results consistent with GAO's findings.  In particular, the GAO mentions an 
area of concern in their 2005 report associated with the number of programmatic 
rebaselines.  Again, this research also came to similar conclusions.  However, this unique 
variable had not been used in any previous research so we decide to add a variable to 
each program called “# of Rebaselines” and see if this variable proves to capture more of 
the uncertainty associated with the prior research in this venue.  It is also noteworthy to 
mention that the development estimate (DE) changes across numerous SARs, multiple 
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times due to rebaselines, therefore the accuracy associated with the amount of schedule 
slip remains to be a key area of concern.  This research realizes the need to study this 
effect, however, this is beyond the scope of this current research.   
Data Assessment 
 The database of this research employs a modified version of a database originally 
built by Sipple (2002) and modified by Bielecki (2003), Moore (2003), Genest (2004), 
Lucas (2004), McDaniel (2004) , Rossetti (2004), and Monaco (2005).  The original use 
of the database predicted cost growth within the cost categories of the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase using both logistic regression to predict if 
cost growth occurs and multiple regression to predict the amount of cost growth and 
lastly used by Monaco (2005) to predict schedule risk.  The database consists of 
information from the 1990 to 2003 SARs, the 1996 RAND report, and the Defense 
System Cost Performance Database: Cost Growth Analysis Using Selected Acquisition 
Reports.   
 This research begins its data collection by thoroughly reviewing the most recent 
databases modified by Monaco (2005) and Genest (2004) since Monaco looks at schedule 
growth and Genest evaluates total RDT&E cost growth.  As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, all past researchers in this venue used the same database.  However, since we 
want to evaluate our new variable in relation to schedule and cost, we hone in on these 
two studies.  The databases consist of programs listed in the SARs from 1990 to 2003.  
The Monaco (2005) research designed its database to predict schedule growth, while the 
Genest (2004) designed its research database to predict total research and development 
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cost growth.  It is noteworthy to mention, that there are other minor variations in these 
two databases, such as additional schedule related variables and excluded programs in the 
case of Monaco (2005).  This research desires a big picture look at how this new variable 
interacts with the two aforementioned databases, therefore we use these two separate 
databases to evaluate schedule and cost growth.  In keeping with the consistency of the 
Monaco (2005) research, we add a program to the database when it is classified as a 
mature program (minimum three years in EMD).  Also for consistency, the previous 
researchers do not include programs that fall under the new milestone labeling scheme of 
A, B, and C compared to a I, II, and III labeling format.  In like manner, this research also 
does not include programs using the new naming convention.  To be consistent with the 
Monaco (2005) database, we follow the same selection criteria in relation to how the 
Monaco research differs from the previous versions of the database.  For example, the 
Monaco (2005) research only includes programs that complete the EMD phase since U.  
S.  Code: Title 10: Section 2432 states: 
“The requirements of this section with respect to a major defense acquisition 
program shall cease to apply after 90 percent of the items to be delivered to the 
United States under the program (shown as the total quantity of items to be 
purchased under the program in the most recent Selected Acquisition Report) 
have been delivered or 90 percent of planned expenditures under the program 
have been made.” (US, 2005) 
 
 When a program meets the aforementioned criteria, one last SAR report based on 
the DE is submitted.  This is the SAR that populates the Genest (2004) and Monaco 
(2005) databases.  Monaco (2005) concludes that it is necessary to wait until a program 
completed the EMD phase to ensure the actual completion date for phase II is captured.  
In keeping with the pace of the Monaco (2005) research, we utilize the same sixty-eight 
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programs, however, Genest (2004) is not as stringent in selection criteria for total 
research and development cost growth so there are 135 data points available.  In addition, 
prior to the Monaco (2005) rendition, other researchers included programs that had been 
terminated, including Genest (2004).  This research also does not include terminated 
programs in our schedule database to maintain parallelism with the Monaco (2005) 
database.  The emanate aspiration of the Monaco (2005) thesis desired to create a 
predictive model for a cost estimator to use to build accurate schedule milestones for 
successful programs.  If a program is terminated before completing EMD, then there 
would not be sufficient information to build a predictive model.  Genest (2004), as 
previously mentioned, has more creative license to take a “big picture” look at total 
research and development cost growth.  Genest (2004) therefore, has more data to work 
with.   
 The databases had uniformity; however, they are arranged into a flat file with no 
specific identifier that ties each program to their respective SAR.  This made it very 
difficult to track each program across many years because one researcher may be using a 
different program than a preceding researcher and cause discontinuity between 
longitudinal research.  Hence, we rearrange and reformat the data using a common 
naming identifier to allow for consistent trend analysis for years to come.  Since each 
SAR in the DoD database uses a unique identification number called the PNO (program 
number), this research scrubs all the programs and realigns them in relation to the PNO.  
This research also changes the Excel file into a Microsoft Access format for collection 
purposes to allow for adding multiple SARs to the database.  In fact, this initiative allows 
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for meta-analysis of other databases which may add to the body of knowledge via future 
research.   
 In addition, we add new sources to our database in an attempt to find new 
predictive variables.  The first data table that we add to the aforementioned database is a 
PNO table.  It consists of a listing of MDAP programs and their respective PNO 
numbers.  This research extracted the data from the CARS DoD website.  This table 
allows for consistency and uniformity of the older Monaco (OSD, 2005a) and Genest 
(2004) databases and any new data that we be add to the primary database.  The next 
source of data came from a series of three GAO reports called the DEFENSE 
ACQUISITIONS: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, which start in 2003 
and end in 2005.  These three reports choose a number of high risk weapon systems and 
assess the status using various indexes to include minimal schedule dates, and basic cost 
and quantity data.  The reports do not include all the active programs so it is not an 
exhaustive database but it does add a different perspective to the primary research 
database but does not fill in any of the missing data gaps.  This research teamed with 
another researcher, inputted the cost and schedule data by hand, and then validated the 
data for accuracy (Walker, 2003; Walker, 2004; Walker, 2005).   
 After an exhaustive search for missing variables, this research identifies the 
variable called “# of Rebaselines.”  This new variable identifies the number of rebaselines 
a program has undergone.  We use this new variable to see if it may be an indicator of 
schedule and cost growth using the databases of Monaco (2005) and Genest (2004).  For 
more information on the aforementioned databases, see the theses of Monaco (2005) and 
Genest (2005).  It is important to understand the direction of this research in relation to 
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using past research.  This research was originally intended to fill in the missing variables 
from prior research, however, this research has taken a slightly different direction in an 
attempt to validate this new predictor variable against already established models that are 
empirically tested and have positive results.  We have no intention of changing the 
direction of our thesis to create entirely new models because that is far beyond the scope 
of our research.   
Exploratory Data Analysis 
 Since much research has already been accomplished in this area, we pick two 
“big picture” data models to use in order to narrow the scope of our research.  We choose 
schedule growth and cost growth models with a significant focus on Monaco (2005) for 
schedule growth and Genest (2004) for RDT&E cost growth.  A review of Sipple’s 
research, indicates that cost growth during EMD is from a mixed distribution.  Roughly 
half of the distribution is continuous, while the rest is massed around zero.  In addition to 
a mixed distribution, Sipple finds a small portion of the programs have negative cost 
variance.  Since Monaco and Genest found similar conclusions as Sipple, we duplicate 
the procedures established in the Sipple research.  We provide an overview of these 
procedures next.   
 We first need to split the data into two sets, discrete and continuous.  The 
theoretical probability of obtaining a specific value is zero with the continuous 
distribution.  Such a probability does not accurately reflect the fact that many of the 
points of past research fall directly on zero.  For the discrete distribution, we use logistic 
regression, and we use multiple regression analysis for the continuous distribution.  First, 
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we attempt to develop a logistic regression model to predict whether or not a program has 
cost or schedule growth from the full data set.  Then we develop a multiple regression 
model from only the programs that actually demonstrate cost or schedule growth to 
predict the amount of cost or schedule growth we expect.  Additionally, to ensure that we 
construct a robust model, we set approximately 20% of our data aside for validation 
before we begin any regression analysis.  Finally, before performing regression, we must 
also choose the response and predictor variables.  For more specific procedures, see 
Sipple’s research (Sipple, 2002:59).   
Response Variables 
 In keeping consistent with past research, we use the same modeling techniques.  
Sipple (2002) concerns itself with two different response variables, one that indicates if 
cost growth occurs and the other variable expresses the degree to which cost growth does 
occur.  Monaco (2005) uses a similar model for schedule growth but is not concerned 
with cost growth.  Since this research is focused on big picture predictability with our 
new variable, we address four response variables.  Hence, this research and in like 
manner, uses two response variables for schedule growth and uses two response variables 
for cost (predicting if growth occurs, predicting the degree of growth).  Since we evaluate 
two distinctly different families of models for our research (one for cost growth and one 
for schedule growth), we use great care to distinctly separate the two models.   
 To narrow the scope of this research, we use the response variables from Monaco 
(2005) and Genest (2004) for schedule and cost growth respectively.  Monaco (2005) 
uses the variable “EMD Schedule Slip?” for its logistic regression model and “EMD 
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Schedule Variance %” as the response variable for the multiple regression model.  
Therefore, when we evaluate the predictability of our new X variable called “# of 
Rebaselines,” we attempt to use the Monaco (2005) response variables for evaluating the 
predictability in reference to schedule growth (Monaco, 2005:124-125).  In a similar 
fashion, this research attempts to use the Genest (2004) response variables to evaluate the 
predictability of our new variable against RDT&E total cost growth.  Genest (2004) uses 
“R&D (Total) Cost Growth?” as the response variable for the logistic regression model 
and “RDT&E Total Cost Growth %” as the response variable for the multiple regression 
model (Genest, 2004:54-55).   
Search for Predictor Variables 
 In an attempt to speed up our research, we look to past research of Sipple (2002) 
and other researchers that followed the same direction to identify proven predictor 
variables.  Our technique remains the same barring the use of the FUE predictor variable 
due to its limited use outside of Army acquisition.  The response variables, exploratory 
data analysis, and logistic regression are identical and hence the aforementioned research 
can be referred to for added insight.  We include a list of the predictor variables used in 
the past research of Sipple (2002) in Appendix B.  Sipple provides a brief description of 
the subcategories and includes elucidation of unclear elements when necessary  (Sipple, 
2002:61).  Monaco (2005) adds additional variables and we include the unabridged list in 
Appendix C.  We do not include the complete variable list from all past researchers 
because there is little variation from the two previously mentioned lists.  We do however; 
include any significant predictor variables of past research in the proceeding paragraphs.   
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 Since the crux of this research is not to create entirely new models to test our 
variable, we dial into already established and predictive variables of past research.  
Genest (2004) provides an excellent summary of significant past predictor variables of 
prior researcher’s final models for logistic and multiple regression.  We include these 
final model variables in Table 9 and Table 10.  Genest’s effort to flesh out these 
significant predictor variables of past theses greatly aids our research efforts.  (Genest, 
2004:51) 
Table 9. Past Research Significant Predictor Variables for Linear Regression 
 
Table 10. Past Research Significant Predictor Variables for Multiple Regression 
 
In addition to the aforementioned variables, we also include a summary table (See Table 
11) from Monaco (2005) to add to our pool of significant predictor variables from prior 
research (Monaco, 2005:106).   
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Table 11. Monaco (2005) Final Model Variables 
Model Response Variable Predictor Variable 
Logistic EMD Schedule Slip? Aircraft? 
 Svs > 1? 
Service = Navy Only? 
Planned EMD Length 
% Proc Funding (yrs) of Total Program 
Planned Unit Cost CY $M 2003 < 5 $M? 
Multiple EMD Schedule Variance % Actual Phase I + Planned EMD Length 
 Modification? 
MS III before IOC ? 
 
 Our new variable called # of Rebaselines comes from the original file that the 
2005 GAO report used, which causes significant alarm pertaining to the number of 
MDAP programs experiencing rebaselines.  The OSD provided this data, which we in 
turn validate against GAO’s report (Levin, 2005).  The database matches perfectly with 
the database of prior research in this vein, however, many of the older programs in our 
database are not populated because the data file contains programs that are active and 
only date back to the late 90’s.  Therefore, the number of programs in our model is 
significantly decreased due to the lack of rebaseline data.  With the candidate predictor 
variables selected, this research turns to the model methodology of logistic regression.   
Logistic Regression 
 Logistic regression is typically used to analyze possible predictive relationships 
when the response is either a nominal or ordinal.  Logistic regression mainly predicts 
binary outcomes, usually coded ‘0’ and ‘1 (Neter et al., 1996:567).    Since we do not 
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charter to fully develop a new model but build upon existing models, we do not fully 
follow procedures of the past.  Past research utilizes logistic regression to develop a 
model that predicts whether or not a program either has schedule and/or cost growth or 
not.  Therefore, in our database, we attempt to use the same coding as Monaco (2005) 
and Genest (2004) who incorporate a ‘1’ for schedule or cost growth and a ‘0’ for no 
schedule or cost growth.  Our cost growth distribution and our schedule growth 
distribution contains only 0’s and 1’s, hence we characterize whether or not a program 
has total cost growth or total schedule growth as a Bernoulli random variable with 
probability p of success (success = one) (Neter et al., 1996:568).  We, in fact, are not able 
to use logistic regression in our research, which we explain in Chapter IV.  We include 
this information for continuity and clarity with past research.  For example, we add the 
logistic regression technique of Sipple (2002) in the proceeding paragraph for this very 
reason.   
 Sipple established the following guidelines for utilizing logistic regression in cost 
growth analysis:  
We use JMP® 4 (SAS Institute, 2001) software to accomplish the logistic 
regression in order to help us identify the best model for estimating whether or not 
a program will have cost growth.  JMP® uses maximum likelihood to estimate the 
coefficients of our model.  Because JMP® has no automatic method, such as 
stepwise, for logistic regression, we manually compute thousands of individual 
regressions, recording our results on spreadsheets.  We start with one-predictor 
models of all possible variables.  Then we regress using all combinations of two 
predictor models and record the results.  We continue this process, eventually 
whittling down the best combinations for use at the next level in order to cut 
down on the amount of regressions necessary.  We stop when we reach a model 
her for which the gain of adding another variable does not warrant the additional 
complexity of the model that another variable adds.  We intend to find several 
candidate models for each number of predictors and then narrow down to the best 
one for each number of predictors and validate the model using about 20 percent 
of the data that we set aside for validation.  (Sipple, 2002:70) 
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Multiple Regression  
 Past research uses multiple regression to discover prediction models for the 
percent of total cost growth and schedule growth based on more than one predictor 
variable.  As previously mentioned, we utilize two distinct models in our analysis; one for 
schedule growth and the other for total RDT&E cost growth.  This research does not 
intend to re-create entirely new models however we investigate how the new predictor 
variable interacts with previously developed research.  Since our goal is to test our new 
variable against already established models.  We do not fully use the entire procedures 
for multiple regression.  We do, however, include the following multiple regression 
guidelines established by Sipple (2002) for descriptive continuity with past research: 
 We use JMP® for the multiple regression analysis.  We use the stepwise 
method to identify those predictor variables that have a statistically significant 
impact on the ability of the model to predict our response variable, Engineering 
%.  From our stepwise analysis, we build models using the standard least squares 
method, whereby JMP® estimates the form of the functional relationship between 
the predictors and the response variable that minimize the sum of squared 
deviations from the predicted values at each level of the predictors (Neter et al, 
1996).   
 Because of the large amount of candidate predictor variables, we exceed 
JMP®’s stepwise calculation abilities when we include all of our variables in a 
single run.  In addition, we seek models with varying numbers of predictors.  
Thus, we must repeat the stepwise and standard least squares several times in 
order to achieve the desired results.  As with logistic regression, we discover 
several candidate models for each number of predictors.  Then we narrow our 
results to the best model for each number of predictors.  We continue adding 
variables to the model until the number of variables equals about one tenth of the 
number of data points used in the model; this ensures we do not over-fit the model 
(Neter et al, 1996:437).  We check the model’s robustness using the same 
validation data as for the logistic regression.  (Sipple, 2002:72) 
 
 Utilizing the methodology found in Sipple's study, we attempt to build four 
regression models.  Two for schedule growth and two models for total RDT&E cost 
growth.  However, since we could not take advantage of logistic regression with this 
 
59 
research (See Chapter IV), we only build two multiple regression models.  Since the 
variable # of Rebaselines is only populated in newer programs from the late 90’s to 
present, this significantly reduces the number of programs that we can utilize in our 
models for schedule growth and total RDT&E cost growth.  We start with 135 data points 
by way of the cost model.  After we remove the data points that contain no rebaseline 
information and the 20% validation set, we are left with significantly less data points to 
use in our model.  Likewise, our schedule model contains even less data due to the 
aforementioned reasons the stringent database guidelines utilized by Monaco (2005).   
 Both the schedule and cost models are highly similar.  The methodological intent 
of the schedule growth database and models are to use logistic regression to predict 
whether or not there will be schedule growth.  We then plan to use multiple regression to 
predict the percentage of schedule growth.  Likewise, with the cost growth model, we 
attempt to use logistic regression to predict if total RDT&E cost growth occurs and then 
we make use of multiple regression to predict the percentage of total RDT&E cost 
growth.  We also apply a log transformation to the response variable in our cost model to 
correct for heteroskedasticity in the residual plot (Sipple, 2002:72).  It is noteworthy to 
mention that we do not need to transform the response variable in our schedule database.  
We discuss this and the final numbers of each database (schedule & cost) in Chapter IV.   
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter is the genesis of our analytical process.  We demonstrate the 
connection between our literature review and the analysis we perform.  Our literature 
review is very important to this methodology.  Interestingly, it was in our literature 
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review that we find that there are no other places to fill in the missing data other then the 
SAR and that many of these MDAPS have multiple rebaselines.  Furthermore, it is this 
specific finding that changes the course of our research.  With no way to fill in the 
missing data, we must look to other ways to evaluate the data.  One such way is to look at 
the data from a longitudinal perspective via the number of rebaselines each program has 
undergone.  The analysis portion of this thesis therefore, takes a different direction by 
utilizing the new predictor variable (# of Rebaselines).  Next, we review the SAR 
database and the various response and predictor variables that are associated with our 
new variable.  Finally, we explain the reasoning for past research in relation to the use of 
logistic and multiple regression techniques and the process in which we incorporate many 
of these techniques in our research.  In Chapter IV, we put into practice our methodology 
that we describe in Chapter III.  We do this by testing the # of Rebaselines against 
formally established schedule and cost models of past research.   
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IV.  Results and Discussion 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter details the results of both the attempted logistic analysis and the 
multiple regression analysis.  In it, we describe the resulting models and their robustness.  
We also analyze the models for statistical legitimacy and practical expediency.  We start 
by evaluating two families of models with the new predictor variable (# of Rebaselines) 
with logistic and multiple regression.  We choose the two families of models because we 
want to test our new variable against the two main categories of past analysis in this 
venue.  The first model family stems from the research by Monaco (2005) with respect to 
schedule growth.  The second model family originates from the research by Genest 
(2004) with respect to total RDT&E cost growth.  Finally, we validate each family of 
models to determine the accuracy, legitimacy, and reasonableness of each model.  It is 
noteworthy to mention, that we evaluate and describe each of these families of models 
separately to maintain coherency with respect to our research.   
Preemptive Data Analysis (Schedule) 
 As previously mentioned, our intentions are not to create entirely new research 
and disregard the work of Monaco (2005) with respect to schedule risk.  On the contrary, 
we intend to build upon this research and test our new variable against Monaco's 
published work.  With that said, we next look at the database of Monaco (2005) to ensure 
we have a foundational dataset to test our variable.   
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 With the Monaco database as our first area of discussion, we first describe the 
database and any changes that we make to the date by Monaco (2005).  We use the same 
database, however, many of the older programs are excluded because we do not have 
rebaseline data on programs from the early 90’s.  The original Monaco database 
contained 68 programs.  With the removal of programs missing rebaseline information, 
our database decreases to 49 programs.  Our subsequent task is to create a validation set 
of those 49 programs.  To do this, we randomly select 80% of our 49 programs and use 
these programs as our working database.  We then use the remaining 20% as our 
validation table.  After we randomly create the 20% validation set and the 80% working 
database, our working database reflects a decrease from 49 to 39 programs.   
 With our working database formulated, we then look at the distribution of the 
multiple regression response variable used by Monaco called EMD Schedule Variance % 
in association with our modified database.  The preliminary stem and leaf plot shows a 
smaller percentage of the programs massed at zero than the research of Monaco (2005).  
This is reasonable due to the decreased number of cases in our database, which lends 









































Figure 1. Stem-and Leaf Plot of Y (Schedule Variance %) 
 We next look at the distribution of both the logistic regression response variable 
used by Monaco and evaluate the distribution of our new predictor variable # of 
Rebaselines for its usefulness for logistic regression.  Monaco's logistic response variable 
was EMD Schedule Slip?  We analyze the response variable distribution of Monaco’s full 
database and compare it to our new 80% working database.  We find the distribution of 
the binary responses of our database significantly different than Monaco (2005) due to 
the removal of the programs that are missing rebaseline information and the 
randomization of that data set.  For example, the percentage of programs that 
demonstrated schedule slips in the full Monaco database are 25% and our newly created 
working database is only 12.8% (See Figure 2).  Not only is the percentage different, but 
the number of programs that experience schedule slip is also different.  For example, the 
original Monaco database had 51 programs that demonstrate schedule slip and our current 
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database only has 34 programs that exhibit schedule slip.  This significant change 
concerns us in respect to validating the logistic model of Monaco and due to the 
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Figure 2. Preliminary Logistic Distribution of Y (Schedule) 
 Next, we look at the distribution of our new predictor variable # of Rebaselines.  
The predictor variable distribution also causes concern because of the very few programs 
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Figure 3. Distribution of New Predictor Variable (Schedule) 
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Since the distribution of the response variable in our model is different and our predictor 
variable only has only one demonstrated program with zero rebaselines, we feel it's 
superfluous to attempt logistic regression with our new predictor variable.  Due to the 
disparity between the number of 1’s and 0’s in our logistic response variable, a logistic 
model would be highly unstable with such a disconnect.  Therefore, we do not attempt 
logistic regression.  For more information on the logistic regression model of past 
schedule research, see Monaco (2005) (Monaco, 2005:64-77).   
Multiple Regression Results (Schedule) 
 Our subsequent step focuses on programs that have a positive schedule slip; the 
programs that have no slip or negative slip are excluded from the model in a similar 
fashion to Monaco's research.  This resulted in our research excluding five programs 
from our model, which brings our total number of programs down to 34 in our working 
database.  Our next step was to re-create Monaco's model and insert the same predictor 
variables to validate the robustness of that model against our modified database.  
Monaco's multiple regression model performs in a similar manner as described in that 
particular research, however, Monaco's adjusted R2 is different from the original model, 
which is understandable because of the differing makeup of our database.  The adjusted 
R2 in the original model is 0.742518 and Monaco’s model demonstrated an R2 of 
0.564831 against our modified database.  It is noteworthy to mention, that all Monaco's 
predictor variables still perform in a highly prognostic manner.  Since Monaco's predictor 
variables perform well, we use that model as a backdrop for testing our new variable (# of 
Rebaselines).  For clarity, we include a table of Monaco's final model response variable 
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and the proven predictor variables from that research in Table 12.  This table is taken 
from Monaco’s research and original database and reflects p-values in respect to that 
research.   
Table 12. Monaco (2005) Multiple Regression Model 
Monaco (2005) Multiple Regression Model  
Y Response Variable 
  
Predictor Variables P Value 




MS III before IOC? 0.0406 
EMD Schedule Vari-
ance % (positive only)  
 
 With our backdrop solidified, we look to our new variable by itself in relation to 
Monaco’s response variable.  When we run the model in JMP® using multiple 
regression, we find no predictability in the variable # of Rebaselines.  We achieve a p-
value of 0.4316, which indicates no benefit to the model.  However, when we rerun the 
model with Monaco's predictor variables in addition to the new variable # of Rebaselines, 
we find it highly predictive (See Table 13).  Our preliminary run shows an adjusted R2 
value of 0.804748, which is significantly higher than Monaco's original model using our 
data, which achieved an R2 of 0.564831.  Due to identical missing data from predictor 
variables Actual Phase I + Planned EMD Length, Modification?, and MS III before 
IOC?, our database is limited to only 25 data points, which is similar to the experience of 
Monaco's research (Monaco, 2005:97-98).   
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Table 13. Final Model with # of Rebaselines 
Final Model With New Variable  
Y Response Variable 
  
Predictor Variables P Value 




MS III before IOC? 0.0011 
EMD Schedule Vari-
ance % (positive only)  
# of Rebaselines <.0001 
 
 Before we move to the validation results, we need to first test our residuals of our 
multiple regression model to ensure the assumptions of the residuals are clearly met.  The 
first assumption is independence.  We follow the same assumptions as Monaco (2005) in 
that we assume independence is met due to the fact that we only use one SAR to obtain 
data for any one program except for the # of Rebaselines variable.  The second 
assumption is normality of the residuals.  We test this assumption by performing a 
Shapiro-Wilk goodness-of-fit test.  Our last assumption is constant variance of the error 
term by performing a Breusch-Pagan test for constant variance (Neter et al., 1996:239).  
 In order to test the normality of the error term, we run a distribution of our 
studentized residuals in JMP®.  We follow the same reasoning as Monaco (2005) for 
converting our residuals to a standard normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one to also look for outliers.  Figure 4 displays the distribution of 
our model.  Based on the fact that all data points are within three standard deviations of 
the mean, no outliers appear to exist in our model.  Also, using an alpha of 0.05 as our 
threshold, we satisfy the assumption of normality with a p-value of 0.7754.  The last 
assumption that we test is constant variance.  Using Microsoft Excel®, we calculate a p-
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value of 0.225678 for the Breusch-Pagan test.  We again compare this p-value to an alpha 
of 0.05 indicating our assumption of constant variance holds.   
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Figure 4. Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normality - EMD Schedule Variance % Model (Schedule) 
 One last test we perform before being fully satisfied with our model for validation 
is the Cook’s Distance test to identify influential data points.  We use JMP® to graph an 
overlay plot of the Cook's Distance values.  Figure 5 shows that we have an influential 
data point in our model.  Program 125 is an influential data point with a Cook’s Distance 
of 0.738.  Neter establishes an influential data point as any point that exceeds the 50 
percentile.  Compared to Neter’s established standard, Program 125 exceeds the 0.5 
threshold (Neter et al., 1996:381).  We therefore temporarily remove Program 125 from 
the model and rerun our regression model.  The adjusted R2 increases from 0.804748 to 
0.836442 and the p-values lose some predictability in two of the predictor variables as 
indicated in Table 14.  With an increase an adjusted R2 and no dramatic change in the p-
values, we feel confident in excluding Program 125, however, we need to recheck our 
assumptions since our model has been modified.   
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Table 14. Multiple Regression Parameters Post Temporary Removal of Program 125 
Final Model With New Variable  
Y Response Variable 
  
Predictor Variables P Value 




MS III before IOC? 0.0095 
EMD Schedule Vari-
ance % (positive only)  
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Figure 5. Cook's Distance Overlay Plot for Influential Data Points - EMD Schedule Variance % 
(Schedule) 
 We now double check our model for the assumptions of the error term since we 
removed Program 125.  We still assume that independence is still valid as we previously 
mention the fact that the SARs are selected separately in different programs.  Our next 
assumption is the assumption of normality of the error term.  We run a distribution of our 
studentized residuals in JMP® and follow the same procedures as we mention previously.  
Figure 6 displays the distribution of our model.  Based on the fact that all data points are 
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within three standard deviations of the mean, no outliers exist in our model.  Also, using 
an alpha of 0.05 as our threshold, we satisfy the assumption of normality with a p-value 
of 0.9679.  The last assumption that we retest is constant variance.  Using Microsoft 
Excel®, we calculate a p-value of 0.121211092 Breusch-Pagan test.  We again compare 
this p-value to an alpha of 0.05 indicating our assumption of constant variance still holds 
even after we remove Program 125.  Lastly, we need to double check for influential data 
points.  The Cook’s distance with Program 125 excluded does not significantly affect the 
model; all programs are less than 0.3 (Figure 7) which is less than Neter’s 0.5 threshold 
(Neter et al., 1996:381).   
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Figure 7. Cook's Distance Overlay Plot with Program 125 Removed (schedule) 
Based on the performance measures, both individually and collectively, we 
believe our model provides us with a robust model with even greater predictive capability 
and statistical reliability than Monaco (2005).  Also, with successful testing of the 
assumptions of the error term and the lack of outliers within our data set, we are certain in 
the ability of our model to correctly predict the degree of schedule variance in a program.  
Located in Appendix D we include the complete JMP® analysis of our final model EMD 
Schedule Variance %.   
We now discuss the parameter estimates of our final model and the linear 
regression formula we submit for validation.  The parameter estimates and linear 
regression formula are located in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.  The values of the 
predictor variables are input into the parenthesis adjacent to each of their respective 
parameters in Figure 9 for the linear regression formula.  We mark each value in the 
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parameter estimates table and draw an arrow to the respective portion of the linear 
regression formula in Figure 9 for clarity.   
Intercept
Actual Phase I + Planned EMD length
MS III bef ore IOC?
Modif ication?
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Figure 8. Parameter Estimates - VIF Scores- (Schedule) 
Intercept
Actual Phase I + Planned EMD length
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у = 0.8758177  −  0.0096(1)  +  0.2126(2)  −  0.2639(3) + 0.0729(4) 






Figure 9. Prediction Formula - Arrows Correspond with Formula Values and Parameter Estimates 
(Schedule) 
 Furthermore, we standardize variable Actual Phase I + Planned EMD Length and 
variable  of Rebaselines to get a proportional picture of the relationship between these 
two continuous variables.  With these two variable standardized, we can evaluate the 
magnitude the variables have on each other in relation to the predictive formula.  In 
Figure 10 we show that one unit change in Actual PH I + Planned EMD Length affects 
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the predicted value roughly two times more than one unit change in # of Rebaselines.  
Furthermore, they have inverse effects from one another. 
Intercept
MS III before IOC?
Modif ication?
# of Rebaslines Standardized
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Figure 10. Standardized Parameter Estimates of Variables [ #-of Rebaselines, Actual Phase I + 
Planned EMD Length] (Schedule) 
 In addition to the parameter estimates, we also include the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) scores in Figures 8, 9, & 10.  Various inflation is a consequence of 
multicollinearity and the VIF scores are a common way for identifying such a 
relationship.  As a general rule, the VIF scores should not exceed 10 (Yu, 2004).  All of 
our VIF scores are below two.  Therefore, each of our independent variables appear to be 
explaining a different fraction of the variability in the model as noted in the R2.   
Validation Results (Schedule) 
 To validate our regression model, we added back the 20% of our database 
previously removed for model building.  We begin our validation by computing the 
estimated confidence intervals of each program based on the parameter estimates and 
values of the independent variables within a 95% confidence interval.  We are careful not 
to include the validation set in our y response.  JMP® computes the upper and lower 
bounds based on the 95% confidence interval.  We then look at the actual dependent 
responses of each program to see if they fall within the upper and lower bound computed 
by JMP®.  The more programs that fall within the bounds of its confidence intervals, the 
 
74 
confident we are in the predictability of our model.  Of the 10 programs in our validation 
set, three programs demonstrate schedule slip; this equates to an 8% validation set.  We 
proceed with validation even though we fall far below the established 20%.  Of the three 
programs, two fell within the bounds of our test, which equates to a 67% prediction 
accuracy.  This is an understandable finding due to the small number of validation 
programs and the diminutive number of programs that demonstrated schedule slip (3).   
 To compensate for the major limitation in our validation set, we use the entire 
database and perform the same validation procedures as previously described.  When we 
compile 100% of the database, we have a total of 36 total programs that experienced 
schedule growth.  Nine of these programs are missing data primarily from the variable 
Planned IOC Date similar to Monaco (2005) and therefore unusable (Monaco, 2005:97).  
Of the 27 usable programs for validation, only one program failed to fall within the upper 
and lower bounds with a 95% confidence interval.  Therefore, 96.3% of our programs 
accurately predicted schedule growth.  Furthermore, we also took an ultraconservative 
approach in validation and looked at the mean confidence intervals of each program and 
set the bounds to 95%.  Of the 27 usable programs, 17 programs pass this stringent test 
for a 59% prediction rate.  It is noteworthy to mention that five of the failed programs 
only fall short by a few percentage points, which theoretically would boost the prediction 
rate to 85%.  We include the entire validation table in Appendix E.  With the validated 
schedule model complete, we move our research to the cost family of model building.   
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Preemptive Data Analysis (Total RDT&E Cost) 
 As previously mentioned, our intentions are not to create entirely new research 
and disregard the work of Genest (2004) with respect to total RDT&E cost growth.  On 
the contrary, we intend to build upon past research and test our new variable against 
Genest’s published work.  With that said, we next look at the database of Genest to 
ensure we have a foundational dataset to test our variable.   
 We first describe the changes in our cost database in contrast to Genest.  We use 
the same database, however, many of the older programs are excluded in a similar 
manner as with our aforementioned research with schedule risk.  The current cost 
database before modifications contains 135 programs.  Our database reduces to 80 
programs when we remove the programs missing rebaseline information.  Our next task 
is to create a validation set of those 80 programs.  After the appropriate rows are selected, 
we save the rows as a subset table in JMP®.  From the remaining 20%, we then create 
another subset table, which is our validation table.  After we randomly create the 20% 
validation set of those 80 programs, our 80% working database decreases to 64 programs.   
 Now that we have evaluated the differences between Genest’s database and ours, 
we now look at the distribution of the multiple regression response variable used by 
Genest called RDT&E % Total Changes.  The preliminary stem and leaf plot in Figure 11 
shows a significant percentage of programs massed at zero, which indicates validity to 
use the two-step approach pioneered by Sipple (2002) and utilized by Genest (2004).  
Thus we attempt to apply that methodology to our research.  As with the former research 
of Sipple (2002) and Genest (2004), we may need to transform the y variable in order to 
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Figure 11. Stem and Leaf Distribution of Y (Cost) 
 With a preliminary look at the multiple regression response variable, we turn our 
attention to the distribution of both the logistic regression response variable used by the 
research of Genest (2004) and evaluate the distribution of our new predictor variable # of 
Rebaselines against it’s usefulness for logistic regression.  Genest's logistic response 
variable was Total R&D Cost Growth?  We analyze the response variable distribution of 
Genest’s full database and compare it to our new 80% working database.  We then find 
the distribution of the binary responses of our database significantly different than Genest 
(2005) due to the removal of the programs that are missing rebaseline information and the 
randomization of that data set.  For example, the percentage of programs that demonstrate 
schedule slips in the full cost database are 32% (43 programs) and our newly created 
working database is only 20% (13 programs) in Figure 12.  This significant change 
concerns us in respect to validating the logistic model of Genest (2004).  This significant 
dichotomy between our 1’s and 0’s is similar to the obscurity in the previously described 
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Figure 12.  Logistic Response Distribution Comparison (RDT&E Total Cost?) 
 Next, we look at the distribution of our new predictor variable # of Rebaselines 
(See Figure 13).  The predictor variable distribution is within normal limits, however, we 
do notice that very few programs experience zero rebaselines (only four programs).   
Since the distribution of the logistic y response variable in our model is different from 
Genest and the disparity of our 1’s and 0’s are significantly skewed, we feel it is again 
unessential to attempt logistic regression with our new predictor variable.  Indeed, due to 
such instability in our logistic response variable, we do not attempt logistic regression.  
For more information on the logistic regression model associated with total RDT&E 
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Figure 13.  Distribution of Predictor Variable - # of Rebaselines (Cost) 
  
Multiple Regression Results (RDT&E Total Cost) 
 Since we are unable to perform logistic regression, we evaluate programs that 
have positive schedule slip via multiple regression.  The programs that have no cost 
growth or negative cost growth are excluded from the model in a similar fashion to 
Genest's research.  This resulted in our research excluding 13 programs from our model, 
which brings our total number of programs down to 51 in our working database.  We then 
to recreate Genest's model and insert the same predictor variables to validate the 
robustness of the model against our modified database.  In order to reconstruct the Genest 
model, we need to transform the dependent variable, which mirrors Genest’s findings due 
to the distribution of the residuals; they can not pass normality.  First, we verify this with 
a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality.  Indeed, we fail to pass normality and the residual 
overlay plot also takes on a clear pattern (See Figure 14).  This flaring pattern does not 
indicate homogeneity of the residuals and is often the result of highly skewed data; 
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therefore, we take transformational measures.  We then create a log transformation of the 
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Figure 14.  Distribution of Y and Residual Plot of Untransformed Model (Cost) 
 Once we transform the y response, we can see that the transformation now passes 
normality consistent with past research (see Figure 15).  We can now evaluate Genest’s 
multiple regression model.  Genest's multiple regression model performed in a similar 
manner as described in their research, however, Genest’s adjusted R2 is significantly 
different from the original model, which we can account for because of the differing 
makeup of our database.  The adjusted R2 in Genest’s original model was 0.362047 and 
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the model demonstrated an R2 of 0.2234 against our modified database.  It is noteworthy 
to mention, that not all Genest’s predictor variables still perform in a prognostic manner.  
The following predictor variables had p-values greater than 0.30, which is far higher than 
the standard of 0.05 outlined in Genest’s model: (LRIP Planned?,  Northrop Grumman).  
Since some of Genest’s predictor variables performed atypically, we are unable to fully 
utilize the model as a backdrop for testing our new variable (# of Rebaselines).   
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Figure 15.  Distribution of Y and Residual Plot of Transformed Model (Cost) 
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 Now that we have a suitably transformed y response variable, we now look to our 
new variable by itself in relation to Genest’s response variable.  When we run the model 
in JMP® using multiple regression, we find no predictability with the variable # of 
Rebaselines when it is used separately in the model.  We also looked to prior research for 
additional predictor variables that could possibly interact with our new variable.  We 
could not demonstrate # of Rebaselines to be predictive by itself or with other known 
predictor variables.  However, we created a model by modifying the variable into a 
discrete format.  This change produced a binary response called Two Rebaselines?.  If a 
program had two rebaselines, it would be coded a 1 and if it did not have exactly two 
rebaselines, it was coded a 0.  We include a table showing the variables in our final 
model below in (See Table 15).   
Table 15. Multiple Regression Model Variables (Cost) 
RDT&E Total Cost Multiple Regression Model (Cost)  
Y Response Variable 
  
Predictor Variables 
Total R&D Cost Growth %   Funding Yrs of R&D Com-
pleted 




 When we rerun the model with our new modified variable Two Rebaselines?, we 
find it considerably predictive.  Our preliminary run shows an adjusted R2 value of 
0.40203, which is significantly higher than Genest’s original model that achieved an R2 
of 0.36205.  Due to missing data from predictor variables, our database is limited to only 
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46 data points, which is similar to the experience of Genest’s research (Genest, 2004:43 
& 49).   
 Before we move to the validation results, we first test the residuals of our multiple 
regression model to ensure the assumptions of the residuals are clearly met.  The first 
assumption is independence.  We follow the same assumptions as previously mentioned 
with our schedule research in that we assume independence is met.  We again lend 
credence to this due to the fact that we use only one SAR to obtain data for only one 
program except for the Two Rebaselines? variable.  The second assumption is normality 
of the residuals in which we test the assumption of normality by performing a Schapiro-
Wilk goodness-of-fit test.  The last assumption is constant variance of the error term.  We 
perform a Breusch-Pagan test for constant variance (Neter et al., 1996:239).   
 We now test for normality and constant variance of the error term.  In order to test 
the normality of the error term, we run a distribution of our studentized residuals in 
JMP® and convert our residuals to a standard normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one to also look for outliers.  Figure 16 below displays the 
distribution of our model.   
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Figure 16.  Studentized Residuals - Distribution (Cost) 
Based on the fact that all data points are within three standard deviations of the mean, no 
outliers appear to exist in our model.  Also, using an alpha of 0.05 as our threshold, we 
satisfy the assumption of normality with a p-value of 0.9589.  The last assumption that 
we test is constant variance.  Using Microsoft Excel®, we calculate a p-value of 
0.606381 for the Breusch-Pagan test.  We again compare this p-value to an alpha of 0.05 
indicating our error term is within normal limits.   
 One last test we perform before we are fully satisfied with our model for 
validation is the Cook’s Distance test to identify influential data points.  We use JMP® to 
graph an overlay plot of the Cook's Distance values.  Figure 17 shows that we do not 
have any influential data points in our model.  All values are less than 0.5 with no one 
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Figure 17.  Cook's Distance Influence (Cost) 
 Based on the performance measures, both individually and collectively, we 
believe our model provides us with a robust model.  Also, with successful testing of the 
assumptions of the error term and the lack of outliers within our data set, we are certain in 
the ability of our model to correctly predict the degree of RDT&E total cost growth 
variance in a program.  However, given the extreme change in our new variable, we are 
cautious to recommend the model for its parsimoniousness.  Especially since our research 
interests are to test the variable # of Rebaselines against the Genest (2004) database 
where the variable falls short in predictability.  We cover more concerning this 
shortcoming in Chapter V.  With that said, we can now subject our model to validation.   
 Located in Appendix F, we include the complete JMP® analysis of our final 
model Total RDT&E Cost Growth %.  The final model also includes the parameter 
estimates with the variance inflation factors (VIF) scores.  All of our VIF scores are 
below two, therefore, we have not over fit our model and each of our independent 
variables is explaining a different fraction of the variability in the model as noted in the 
R2 (Yu, 2004).   
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Validation Results (RDT&E Total Cost) 
 To validate our regression model, we add back the 20% of our database 
previously removed for model building.  We begin our validation by computing the 
estimated prediction intervals of each program based on the parameter estimates and 
values of the independent variables within a 95% prediction interval.  JMP® computes 
the upper and lower bounds based on the 95% prediction interval.  We then look at the 
actual dependent responses of each program to see if they fall within the upper and lower 
bound computed by JMP®.  The more programs that fall within the bounds of its 
prediction intervals, the greater success we have with our model.  Of the 16 programs in 
the 20% validation set, 5 programs demonstrate no schedule growth and two programs 
are missing data which brings the number of usable programs to 9.  This brings our 
validation set to 11.3 % which is far below our goal of 20%.  Nevertheless, we proceed 
cautiously with our validation set.  Two programs of our validation set of 9 programs fell 
outside the bounds of our test which equates to 78% prediction accuracy.  This is an 
understandable finding due to the small number of validation programs and the 
diminutive number of programs that demonstrated cost growth (9).   
 To compensate for the major limitation in our validation set, we use the entire 
database and perform the same validation procedures as previously described in our 
schedule growth section.  When we compile 100% of the database, we have a total of 63 
programs that experience cost growth.  Eight of these programs are missing data which 
gives our research 55 usable programs for validation.  Only four programs fail to fall 
within the upper and lower bounds with a 95% prediction interval.  Therefore, 93% of 
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our programs accurately predict schedule growth.  Furthermore, we also took the same 
conservative approach as we did with the validation of our schedule model.  We look at 
the mean confidence intervals of each program and set the bounds to a 95% prediction 
interval.  Of the 55 usable programs, 21 programs pass this stringent test for a 38% 
prediction rate.  With the validated schedule model complete, we review Chapter IV.   
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter demonstrates our methodology in action.  In Chapter III, we make 
obvious the need to research our new variable and compare it against established research 
of others in this area.  Subsequently, we decide to observe our new variable in relation to 
cost growth and schedule growth using the databases from prior research in this vein.   
 Furthermore, we use the research of Monaco (2005) as a foundational model to 
evaluate our variable in association with schedule growth.  Early in our preemptive 
analysis of our schedule database, we find our database variable is not suited for logistic 
regression due to the skewed dichotomy between the 1’s and 0’s of the responses in our 
database which leads us to reject logistic regression.  However, we find Monaco's model 
to be very predictive with our modified schedule database for multiple regression.  We 
then evaluate our new variable # of Rebaselines against the already established variables 
by Monaco and find Monaco's model significantly more predictive with our new variable.  
We also find that are schedule model is highly predictive and parsimonious from our 
validation results.   
 Finally, we attempt to use the research of Genest (2004) in a similar fashion as we 
did with Monaco (2005) in association with total RDT&E cost growth.  Again, we find 
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that our modified database is not well suited for logistic regression for the same reasons 
from our research with schedule growth.  We look at the Genest’s model and database 
and find that the model is not as predictive with our modified cost database.  In fact, two 
of Genest's predictor variables are not enhancing the model so they are removed.  In 
addition, we can not demonstrate any predictive ability of our new variable # of 
Rebaselines with the cost database.  However, when we modify the variable into a 
discrete form called Two rebaselines?, we derive at a predictive model.  This hybrid cost 
model passes all common statistical assumptions and validates as a predictive model.  We 
are not secure concerning the utility of the cost model and discuss this matter later in 
Chapter V.  In fact, we have generated a number of interesting discoveries in addition to 
our cost model in which we extrapolate in Chapter V.   
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter, we draw all our research together into a cohesive package.  We 
first look at the original problems that we face in Chapter I and gauge our success on the 
basis of our research objectives.  We then review our literature results and summarize our 
findings.  Subsequently, we restate our methodology and evaluate our results.  Finally, 
we address our limitations, provide our recommendations, and suggest possible follow-on 
theses for future research. 
Explanation of the Problem 
 Data analysis with genuine data is complex and full of uncertainty.  One may 
compound the complexity even more when their database is riddled with missing data.  
One such database is that of Monaco (2005).  Monaco expounds upon this by 
highlighting the fact that missing data is the primary limitation.  Indeed, Monaco (2005) 
finds that approximately 27% of programs that otherwise meets the researcher’s criteria 
does not have a reported value for one of the four necessary schedule dates, e.g.  planned 
and actual dates for Milestone II and Milestone III.  Of the programs missing the 
appropriate schedule dates, Planned MS II, Actual MS II, Planned MS III, and Actual MS 
III did not have complete data 56%, 28%, 72%, and 56% of the time respectively. 
Monaco further states that one of the most promising predictor variables, FUE, is only 
present 19.4% of the time (Monaco, 2005:110).  From our identified problem, we then 
formulate objectives for our research. 
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 The objectives of this thesis as we describe in Chapter I are threefold.  First, we 
explore the reasons for the missing data via our literature review in Chapter II.  Second, 
our research attempts to build up the current database and add potential enhancing 
variables to it which we explain in Chapter III.  Third, this investigation reruns the 
Monaco (2005) model and possibly other models and compares the results and 
determines if the model(s) remain stable and consistent with the original research.  This 
thesis attempts to use the same logistic regression and multiple regression model(s) used 
in the research of Monaco and others to validate and compare results.  We find the 
answer to our first research objective in our literature review in Chapter II, which we 
summarize in the next paragraph. 
Review of Literature 
 We find the primary reasons for missing data in our literature review.  DoD 
Regulation 5000.2-R proved very helpful to our research; it states that DoD requires PMs 
to minimally include schedule dates for program initiation, major decision points, and the 
attainment of initial operating capability (IOC).  This vagueness allows PMs creative 
license to include a potpourri of schedule dates that suit their specific needs, however, 
this is not standardized across MDAPS (DoD, 2001).  This finding is significant because 
Monaco (2005) and Moore (2003) found FUE as a very powerful predictor variable, 
however, since it is primarily an Army schedule parameter, it is missing across the 
majority of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  Another reason for missing 
data is that some of the data is classified and therefore we can not report the data which is 
emphasized by the 2005 GAO report as a primary problem with the SAR (Levin, 2005).  
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One final reason is found in the aforementioned RAND study and GAO reports, which 
highlight the fact that the SAR reporting requirements have changed significantly over 
the past three decades, which explains the large variation in schedule data.  Indeed, we 
refer you back to the end of Chapter II to Table 6 and Table 7 to further emphasize the 
SAR’s astonishing historical evolution.  With one objective answered, we find the 
response to our second research objective in Chapter III (Methodology). 
Review of Methodology 
 Before we move our research to statistical analysis, we must first answer our 
second research objective; we attempt to build up the current database and add potential 
enhancing variables to it.  We start with a literature review as a template to acquire 
direction for our research.  We then scour DoD for possible data sources, which results in 
no other possible avenues for new data that pertains to MDAPs other than the SAR.  With 
a portion of our second objective unachievable, we need to approach our schedule 
variable problem from a different perspective.  Indeed, we search for new variables that 
look at MDAPs from a longitudinal perspective.  In fact, the 2005 GAO report criticizing 
programmatic rebaselining is the catalyst that we need for the creation of a new variable, 
# of Rebaselines (Levin, 2005).  With a spark of hope towards achieving a portion of our 
second objective, we now move our research towards a methodology for statistical 
analysis to frame the answer to our second and third research objectives. 
 With our second and third research objectives, we combine them to structure our 
statistical methodology; we need to test our new variable against established research in 
this vein of study.  We choose to evaluate the work of Monaco (2005) and Genest (2004) 
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because Monaco takes a broad look at schedule and Genest evaluates RDT&E cost 
growth with a big picture approach.  We feel using these models will best answer our last 
two research objectives.  Our intentions are not to recreate new models because that 
causes redundancy and our outcome would be similar to the past and not add to the body 
of knowledge.  We start our methodological approach by reviewing the past research of 
Sipple (2002) who initiated using the two step regression model approach which Monaco 
(2005) and Genest (2004) followed.   
 Then we prepare our database for analysis.  We randomly create an 80% working 
database and reserve 20% of the database for validation.  We need to do this procedure 
for two databases, one for schedule and one for total RDT&E cost.  We also try to use the 
exact same methods of selecting programs for each database that Monaco and Genest use 
for analysis.  We then adopt the two step model.  The first step starts with logistic 
regression using a binary response that predicts weather or not schedule growth or cost 
growth will occur.  The second step uses multiple regression to predict the degree or 
percentage that each program will experience schedule or cost growth.  It is noteworthy 
to mention that since we evaluate our new variable against two separate models, we 
believe it is paramount to report each model family separately (schedule and cost) to 
avoid confusion.  Now that we have a basic plan of attack, we review the variables of 
both past schedule and cost models from Monaco and Genest and then attempt to 
reduplicate their results and then analyze the models with our new variable which we 
perform in Chapter IV.  We restate our results in the next paragraph. 
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Restatement of Results 
 We use the research of Monaco (2005) as a foundational model to evaluate our 
variable in association with schedule growth.  Early in our preemptive analysis of our 
schedule database, we find our database variable is not suited for logistic regression due 
to the skewed dichotomy between the 1’s and 0’s of the responses in our database which 
leads us to reject logistic regression.  However, we find that Monaco's model is very 
predictive with our modified schedule database for multiple regression.  We then evaluate 
our new variable # of Rebaselines against the already established variables by Monaco 
and find Monaco's model significantly more predictive with our new variable.  We also 
find that our schedule model is highly predictive and parsimonious from our validation 
results.  One of the most striking results to our research is that the research of Monaco 
(2005) is very robust even with a modified database and fewer programs.  Furthermore, 
our new variable, # of Rebaselines, boosted the adjusted R2 of our model (.836442) by 
approximately 70% compared to Monaco’s original model pitted against our database.  
We can theorize why this is true because each time a program rebaselines, it runs the risk 
of delaying program development, which leads to schedule growth.   
 We are pleased that this variable greatly increases the predictability of Monaco’s 
research.  We include the final model parameter results for review in Figure 18.  By 
glancing at the predictor variables, one can theorize the weight of each predictor variable 
in our model.  You can see that one unit change in # of Rebaselines increases the 
expected percentage of schedule slip by roughly 7.3%.  To further see how the variables 
from Monaco (2005) interact, we encourage reviewing Monaco’s Explanation of the 
Independent Variables in Final Models which we include in Appendix G.  In addition, 
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our model passes all the assumptions and the validation results are substantially 
significant.  In fact, of the 27 usable programs for validation, only one program failed to 
fall within the upper and lower bounds with a 95% confidence interval.  Therefore, 
96.3% of our programs accurately predict the percentage of schedule growth. 
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Figure 18. Review of Final Model Parameters (Schedule) 
 Finally, we attempt to use the research of Genest (2004) in a similar fashion as we 
did with Monaco (2005) in association with total RDT&E cost growth.  Again, we find 
that our modified database is not well suited for logistic regression for the same reasons 
from our research with schedule growth.  We look at the Genest’s model and database 
and find that the model is not as predictive with our modified cost database.  In fact, two 
of Genest's predictor variables are not enhancing the model so they are removed.  In 
addition, we can not demonstrate any predictive ability of our new variable # of 
Rebaselines with the cost database.   
However, when we modify the variable into a discrete form called Two 
rebaselines?, we derive at a predictive model.  This hybrid cost model passes all common 
statistical assumptions and validates as a predictive model.  We are not secure concerning 
the utility of the cost model since we made a number of changes to the predictor variables 
and modified our own variable.  In fact, we make so many changes to the original 
RDT&E cost model that we suggest that a future researcher evaluate this model for 
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usefulness.  Although we have accomplished great strides in our research, we have a 
number of limitations, which we discuss next. 
Limitations 
 Our primary limitation parallels the research of its predecessors; we suffer from 
missing data.  In fact, all of our statistical limitations are caused by missing data.  Indeed, 
we were not able to add to our database for the same reasons stated by Monaco (2005) 
and others.  Ironically, one of our research objectives is to attempt to fill in the missing 
dates.  We therefore could not oblige that objective due to the fact that there are not any 
other credible sources for that data.  In addition, our data is even further restricted by 
reason that we can not gather rebaseline data on all our programs from both databases 
(schedule and cost).  For example, the Monaco schedule database originally contained 68 
programs, however, 19 of those programs did not have rebaseline data available from 
OSD.  This leaves us with 49 programs minus the validation set of 10 programs, which 
results to 39 programs in our 80% working database.  Of those 39 programs, they are 
missing the same data mentioned in Monaco (2005).   
With the aforementioned missing data and the one program that we remove 
because it is an influential data point, we are left with 24 programs for our schedule 
database.  Indeed, this leaves us with a 6:1 ratio of data points to each predictor variable 
which may limit the power of our test.  However, since we are testing theory and using a 
proven model, we believe that our model is still very robust when we compare it to 
Monaco’s research.  We include a table showing the comparison of data/models between 
our database and the database of Monaco (2005) in Table 16.  We also are missing data 
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with the Genest cost database in a similar manner; however, we start out with more 
programs (135) when compared with the Monaco database.  We also do not compare 
model descriptive statistics with the Genest (2004) model since our cost model is so 
dissimilar.   
Table 16. Comparison Regression Results of Monaco (2005) and Cross (2006) 
Multiple Regression Model Monaco (2005) Cross (2006) 
R2 0.7674 0.86489 
Adjusted R2 0.7425 0.8364 
Data Point: Variable Ratio 10.7:1 6:01 
P-Value Summation 0.0408 0.0143 
# of Observations 32 24  
 The fact that we are missing data also affects our ability to perform logistic 
regression in both models (schedule & cost) since the dichotomy between our 1’s and 0’s 
responses are so different and the ratio between 1’s and 0’s are completely skewed.  For 
example, the percentage of programs that demonstrated schedule slips in the full Monaco 
database are 25% and our newly created 80% working database is only 12.8%. 
Additionally, since we have limited data, this also spills into our validation 
results.  For example, in our schedule database, our schedule validation set starts with 10 
programs.  Three programs demonstrate schedule slip; this equates to an 8% validation 
set.  We proceed with validation even though we fall far below the established 20%.  Of 
the three programs, two fell within the bounds of our test, which equates to a 67% 
prediction accuracy.  We understand this as a suitable finding due to the small number of 
validation programs and the diminutive number of programs that demonstrated schedule 
slip (3).   
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To compensate for the major limitation in our validation set, we use the entire 
database and perform the same validation procedures as previously described.  When we 
compile 100% of the database, we have a total of 36 total programs that experience 
schedule growth.  Nine of these programs are missing data primarily from the variable 
Planned IOC Date similar to Monaco (2005) and therefore unusable (Monaco, 2005:97).   
Our subsequent limitation concerns our entire RDT&E cost database which is 
patterned from Genest (2004).  First, we are not able to use logistic regression because of 
what we previously mention concerning the skewed dichotomous response variable.  
Second, we look at Genest’s model and database and find that the model is not as 
predictive with our modified cost database.  In fact, two of Genest's predictor variables 
are not enhancing the model so we remove them.  In addition, we can not demonstrate 
any predictive ability with our new variable # of Rebaselines with the cost database.   
However, when we modify the variable into a discrete form called Two 
rebaselines?, we derive at a predictive model.  Nevertheless, the original model is 
comparatively different.  We use additional predictive variables from past research, 
however, our model is far dissimilar.  This hybrid cost model passes all common 
statistical assumptions and validates as a predictive model, however, we recommend the 
analyst to use caution with this model since it is grossly different than the original model.  
In fact, since our scope is not to build entirely new models, we believe this model 
requires further research before it is used in the field.  We include Figure 19 to further 
emphasize the diversity between the two models. 
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Genest (2004) [R2=0.3620] 
Term  Estimate  Std Error   t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept    -1.070473 0.784431 -1.36 0.1781
Northrop Grum-
man    1.3557629 0.664538 2.04 0.0463
Funding Yrs of 
R&D Completed    0.132762 0.025576 5.19 <.0001
Maturity of EMD 
at IOC%     -1.929685 0.813505 -2.37 0.0214
Prototype?   0.8669499 0.346592 2.5 0.0155
Significant pre-
EMD activity  -0.968515 0.325376 -2.98 0.0044
LRIP Planned?   0.7522629 0.302415 2.49 0.0160
Cross (2006) [R2=0.4203] 
Term  Estimate  Std Error   t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept -1.907099 0.287564 -6.63 <.0001
Funding Yrs of 
R&D Completed 0.0783691 0.021204 3.7 0.0006
Fixed-Price 
EMD Contract? -1.195237 0.395955 -3.02 0.0044
Two Rebaseli-
nes? 1.5694569 0.382439 4.1 0.0002
Sea -1.152497 0.412615 -2.79 0.0079  
Figure 19. Multiple Regression Parameter Comparison between Genest (2004) & Cross (2006) 
 Our final limitation concerns the lack of published literature on the SAR.  Indeed, 
we could not find a peer reviewed article that is dedicated to the SAR.  We had to resort 
to research from GAO reports, RAND studies, DoD regulations and even DoD internet 
sources, which causes some concern on our part.  However, we feel that the information 
that we present in this research is credible and accurate.  Now that we have presented our 
limitations, we make future recommendations in the proceeding paragraphs. 
Recommendations  
 The two step regression technique created by Sipple (2002) continues to benefit 
the analysis community as a valuable tool based on the validation from other researchers 
like Monaco (2005) for example.  We believe that the two step method is superior for 
detecting schedule and cost growth.  In fact, we also recommend that the researcher and 
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the analyst use the techniques of Monaco (2005) for predicting schedule risk.  In addition, 
we find the Monaco (2005) multiple regression model even more predictive by at least 
10% when we apply our new variable called # of Rebaselines.  Although we highly 
suggest utilizing the schedule model, we do not recommend the analyst utilize our 
RDT&E cost model until it is further researched due to the drastic changes we make to 
the predictive model. 
 Another recommendation is based on our literature review and our search for 
missing data across DoD.  We believe that the SAR has come a long way in 30 years, 
however, we are concerned that with so much change; programs become very difficult to 
compare across the board.  In fact, we recommend that DoD explicitly identify and 
increase the number of the required standard schedule milestones to match the same 
schedule dates that are mentioned in the research of Monaco (2005).  With a standard 
requirement for schedule parameters, the analyst should be able to predict even tighter 
increments of schedule and cost growth.  Another area of concern is associated with 
spiral development.  Since each spiral initiative is different, e.g. each program funds a 
different number of spirals and prototypes, how will the analyst of the future compare 
these programs?  This is another reason why we think future research should focus 
longitudinally since we cannot find or recreate missing variables like FUE. 
 In addition, we would be remiss not to readdress the recommendations by GAO in 
their 2005 report.  We also concur with the recommendations of the 2005 GAO report 
based on our research of the SAR.  The report outlines many recommendations to include 
transformations in the rebaseline and reporting process.  We include their major problems 
and recommendations in Table 17. 
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Table 17. 2005 GAO Report Problem/Solution Summary Table 
Problem Solution 
Information for Congress on unit cost perform-
ance could be more complete and Year-to-year 
unit cost changes are not measured and re-
ported. 
Measure and report a full history of unit cost 
performance in constant dollars by comparing 
the latest cost in quantity estimates with: the 
first full estimate (typically the original acqui-
sition program baseline established at mile-
stone B), the current approved baseline, or if 
the program rebaselines, the prior approved 
program baseline, and the estimate established 
with the previous year's budget request. 
Rebaselining can occur during each phase of 
acquisition, sometimes frequently on individual 
programs. N/A 
Reporting of rebaselinings could be timelier Notify Congress when rebaselining actions are 
approved.  
In some cases, DoD reduces the magnitude of 
unit cost growth for Nunn -McCurdy determi-
nations. 
Fully disclose to Congress the nature and ex-
tent of programmatic adjustments affecting 
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds and terminations, 
pending any congressional direction on this 
issue. 
Unclassified data is unnecessarily restricted. Separately report classified and unclassified 
SAR information. 
 
 Our last recommendation stems from the database that contains the SAR called 
Ostrich and the method for presenting the data called DAMIR.  As we previously 
mention in Chapter II, the Ostrich database is not normalized in third normal form.  We 
also previously mention that this is due primarily to the legacy system that feeds into the 
Ostrich database.  In other words, the database is designed to support CARS and now the 
system is functioning partially in a relational format via DAMIR.  Although we do not 
have all the facts of the genesis of the database, we do have the data dictionary and the 
shell of the database to examine.  We recommend a complete transformation of this 
database.  In our opinion, many systems are limited due to an improper design or have 
had small evolutionary changes to an old design which renders it unable to adapt to 
change.  Additionally, we recommend using system analysis and design techniques in 
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concert with lean principles to reengineer the process/system as outlined by James P. 
Womack and Daniel T. Jones, in their book Lean Thinking (Womack et al., 2003).   
Possible Follow-on Thesis 
 We further support future researchers using this database and the additional 
metadata that we have created with this research.  We encourage populating the database 
with newer programs and look for additional variables that take a longitudinal approach 
such as our variable call # of Rebaselines.  In addition, we recommend researching the 
variability of rebaselined dates as mentioned in the 2005 GAO report.  The report states 
further that the first rebaseline estimate date may not stay the same but change.  Thus we 
recommend looking at each rebaseline, starting with the first development estimate from 
the early SAR as opposed to the development estimate date on the most recent SAR.  We 
suggest this to see if the model demonstrates robustness for changing the development 
estimate baseline.  In addition, we suggest that the researcher attempt to analyze 
rebaselined information incrementally between each baseline to possibly measure 
predictability in smaller units.  Furthermore, we propose using our model that predicts 
schedule growth to see if an incremental change in the schedule model influences cost 
growth. 
 We also suggest further research with our modified cost model for usefulness.  
One may possibly combine that model with what we previously mention concerning a 
future schedule growth-cost growth model.  It is quite possible that the researcher may be 
able to build a highly predictive model based on the Monaco (2005) model with our 
 
101 
additional variable and use the results of that model to further define the relationship 
between schedule growth and cost growth. 
 One last recommendation for future research concerns the database that contains 
the SAR information.  Earlier we recommended that the Ostrich database takes a business 
process reengineering transformation to further meet the needs of the DoD analyst.  Since 
this process requires great care and planning, we recommend a joint partnership with the 
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).  There exists the possibility for group research 
that may save precious DoD money and time.  Indeed, this also enhances the graduate-
level education of the researchers at AFIT and may lead to other money saving 
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List of Predictor Variables (From Sipple 2002) 
 
Program Size Variables 
• Total Cost CY $M 2002 (Continuous) 
• Total Quantity (Continuous) 
• Prog Acq Unit Cost (Continuous) 
• Qty during PE (Continuous) 
• Qty planned for R&D$ (Continuous) 
 
Physical Type of Program 
• Domain of Operation Variables (Binary) 
o Air, Land, Space, & Sea 
• Function Variables (Binary) 





• Military Service Management (Binary) 
o Services (Svs) >1, Svs >2, Svs>3, Service = Navy Only, Service = 
Joint, Service = AF Only, Lead Svc = Army, Lead Svc = Navy,Lead 
Svc = DoD, Lead Svc = AF, AF Involvement, N Involvement, MC 
Involvement, & AR Involvement 
• Contractor Characteristics (Binary) 
o Lockheed-Martin, Northrup Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon, Litton, 
General Dynamics, No Major Defense KTR, More than 1 Major 
Defense KTR, & Fixed-Price EMD Contract 
 
Schedule Characteristics 
• RDT&E and Procurement Maturity Measures (Continuous) 
o Maturity (Funding Yrs complete), Funding YR Total Program Length, 
Funding Yrs of R&D Completed, Funding Yrs of Prod Completed, 
Length of Prod in Funding Yrs, Length of R&D in Funding Yrs, R&D 
Funding Yr Maturity %, Proc Funding Yr Maturity %, & Total 
Funding Yr Maturity % 
• EMD Maturity Measures (Continuous) 
o Maturity (Funding Yrs complete), Funding YR Total Program Length, 
Funding Yrs of R&D Completed, Funding Yrs of Prod Completed, 
Length of Prod in Funding Yrs, Length of R&D in Funding Yrs, R&D 
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Funding Yr Maturity %, Proc Funding Yr Maturity %, & Total 
Funding Yr Maturity, Maturity from MS II in mos, Actual Length of 
EMD, MS II-based Maturity of EMD%, IOC-based Maturity of 
EMD%, & FUE-based Maturity of EMD% 
• Concurrency Indicators (Binary & Continuous) 
o MS III Complete, Proc Started based on Funding Yrs, & Proc Funding 
before MSIII (Binary) 




• # Product Variants in this SAR (Continuous) 
• Security Classification (Binary) – Class S, Class C, Class U, & Class at Least 
S 
• Risk Mitigation (Binary) 
• Versions Previous to SAR (Binary) 
• Modification (Binary) 
• Prototype (Binary) 
• Dem/Val Prototype (Binary) 
• EMD Prototype (Binary) 
• Did it have a PE (Binary) 
• Significant pre-EMD activity immediately prior to current version 
• (Binary) 
• Did it have a MS I (Binary) 




List of Predictor Variables (From Monaco 2005) 
 
Program Size Variables  
 
 • 1 Planned Total Cost CY $M 2003 – continuous variable which indicates the 
planned total costs of the program at the time of the DE in CY $M 2003  
 • 2 Qty Planned for R&D – continuous variable which indicates the R&D 
quantity at the time of the DE  
 • 3 Qty Planned for Proc - continuous variable which indicates the 
procurement quantity at the time of the DE  
 • 4 Total Quantity planned – continuous variable equal to 2 Qty Planned for 
R&D plus 3 Qty Planned for Proc  
 • 5 Planned Unit Cost CY $M 2003 – continuous variable which equals 1 
Planned Total Cost CY $M 2003 divided by 4 Total Quantity planned  
 • 6 ACAT 1? – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 
Physical Type of Program Variables  
 
 • Domain of Operation Variables  
 
 • 7 Air – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes programs that 
primarily operate in the air; includes air-launched tactical missiles and 
strategic ground-launched or ship-launched missiles  
 • 8 Land – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes tactical ground-
launched missiles; does not include strategic ground-launched missiles  
 • 9 Space – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes satellite programs 
and launch vehicle programs  
 • 10 Sea – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes ships and ship-
borne systems other than aircraft and strategic missiles  
 
 • Function Variables  
 
 • 11 Electronic – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all computer 
programs, communication programs, electronic warfare programs that do not 
fit into the other categories  
 • 12 Helo – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; helicopters  
 • 13 Missile – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all missiles  
 • 14 Aircraft – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; does not include 
helicopters  
 • 15 Munition – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 16 Land Vehicle – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
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 • 17 Space (Rand) –binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 18 Ship – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all watercraft  
 • 19 Other – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; any program that does not 
fit into one of the other function variables  
 
Management Characteristics  
 
 • Military Service Management  
 
 • 20 # of Svs - continuous variable to indicate the number of services involved 
in the program  
 • 21 Svs > 1 – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services 
involved at the date of the SAR  
 • 22 Svs > 2 – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services 
involved at the date of the SAR  
 • 23 Svs > 3 – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services 
involved at the date of the SAR  
 • 24 Service = Navy Only – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 25 Service = Joint – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 26 Service = Army Only – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 27 Service = Marines Only – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 28 Service = AF Only – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 29 Lead Svc = Army – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 30 Lead Svc = Navy – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 31 Lead Svc = DoD – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 32 Lead Svc = AF – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 33 Air Force Involvement – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 34 Navy Involvement – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 35 Marine Corps Involvement – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 36 Army Involvement – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 
 • Contractor Characteristics  
 
 • 37 Lockheed-Martin – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 38 Northrop Grumman – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 39 Boeing – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 40 Raytheon – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 41 General Dynamics – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 42 No Major Defense Contractor – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; a 
program that does not use one of the contractors mentioned immediately 
above = 1  
 • 43 More than 1 Major Defense Contractor – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 
for no; programs including more than one of the contractors listed above = 1  




Schedule Characteristics  
 
 • 45 Program has a MS I? – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 46 Planned Time from MS I to MS II – continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS I date from the MS II date based on the DE  
 • 47 Actual Time from MS I to MS II – continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the current estimate MS I date from the current estimate MS II 
date recorded in the last DE SAR  
 • 48 Phase I Slip? - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 49 Length of Phase I Slip – continuous variable equal to 47 Actual Time 
from MS I to MS II minus 46 Planned Time from MS I to MS  
 • 50 Planned EMD Length – continuous variable calculated by subtracting the 
MS II date from the MS III date based on the DE  
 • 51 Actual Phase I + Planned EMD Length – continuous variable calculated 
by adding 47 Actual Time from MS I to MS II and 50 Planned EMD Length  
 • 52 Planned Time from MS II to PDR – continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS II date from the preliminary design review date based on 
the DE  
 • 53 Planned Time from MS II to CDR - continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS II date from the critical design review date based on the 
DE  
 • 54 Planned Time from MS II to FUE - continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS II date from the first unit equipped date based on the DE  
 • 55 Planned Time from MS II to IOC - continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS II date from the initial operational capability date based on 
the DE  
 • 56 Planned Time from MS II to production contract award - continuous 
variable calculated by subtracting the MS II date from the production contract 
award date based on the DE  
 • 57 Planned Time from EMD contract award to MS III - continuous variable 
calculated by subtracting the EMD contract award date from the MS III date 
based on the DE  
 • 58 Planned Time from EMD contract award to IOC- continuous variable 
calculated by subtracting the EMD contract award date from the initial 
operational capability date based on the DE  
 • 59 Planned Time from EMD contract award to production contract award- 
continuous variable calculated by subtracting the EMD contract award date 
from the production contract award date based on the DE  
 • 60 Planned EMD start (proxy for tech complexity) – continuous variable 
ascertained by calculating the number of months the planned EMD start date 
exceeds Jan 1, 1970.   
 • 61 Planned Time from MS II to LRIP – continuous variable calculated by 
subtracting the MS II date from the LRIP date based on the DE  
 




 • 62 LRIP Planned ? - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates if the 
program had LRIP planned  
 • 63 Planned LRIP Quantity – continuous variable which indicates the number 
of LRIP articles planned based on the DE  
 • 64 Funding YR Total Program Length – continuous variable which indicates 
the total number of years for which the program has either RDT&E funding or 
procurement funding budgeted  
 • 65 Funding Yrs of R&D Completed – continuous variable which indicates 
the number of years completed for which the program had RDT&E funding 
budgeted  
 • 66 Funding Yrs of Proc Completed – continuous variable which indicates the 
number of years completed for which the program had procurement funding 
budgeted  
 • 67 Length of R&D in Funding Yrs – continuous variable which indicates the 
number of years for which the program has RDT&E funding budgeted  
 • 68 Length of Proc in Funding Yrs – continuous variable which indicates the 
number of years for which the program has procurement funding budgeted  
 • 69 R&D Funding Yr Maturity % – continuous variable which equals 65 
Funding Yrs of R&D Completed divided by 67 Length of R&D in Funding Yrs  
 • 70 Proc Funding Yr Maturity % – continuous variable which equals 66 
Funding Yrs of Proc Completed divided by 68 Length of Proc in Funding Yrs  
 • 71 % R&D funding of total program funding – continuous variable which 
equals 67 Length of R&D in Funding Yrs divided by 64 Funding YR Total 
Program Length  
 • 72 % Proc funding of total program funding - continuous variable which 
equals 68 Length of Proc in Funding divided by 64 Funding YR Total 
Program Length  
 • 73 Proc Started based on Funding Yrs – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for 
no; if procurement funding is budgeted in the year of the SAR or before, then 
= 1  
 • 74 Proc Funding before MS III – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no  
 • 75 # Product Variants in this SAR – continuous variable which indicates the 
number of versions included in the EMD effort that the current SAR addresses  
 • 76 Class – S – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification 
Secret  
 • 77 Class – C – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification 
Confidential  
 • 78 Class – U – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification 
Unclassified  
 • 79 Risk Mitigation – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates 




 • 80 Versions Previous to SAR – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; 
indicates whether there was a significant, relevant effort prior to the DE; a 
pre-EMD prototype or a previous version of the system would apply  
 • 81 Modification – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether 
the program is a modification of a previous program  
 • 82 Prototype – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the 
program had a prototyping effort  
 • 83 Dem/Val Prototype – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates 
whether the prototyping effort occurred in the PDRR phase  
 • 84 EMD Prototype – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates 
whether the prototyping effort occurred in the EMD phase  
 • 85 PE? – binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the 
program had a Planning Estimate  
 • 86 Significant pre-EMD activity immediately prior to current version – 
binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the program had 
activities in the schedule at least six months prior to MSII decision  
 • 87 Funding Yrs of R&D Complete <= 10? – binary variable which indicates 
if 65 Funding Yrs of R&D Completed is less or equal to 10 years: 1 for yes 0 
for no  
 • 88 Funding Yrs of Proc Complete <= 6? – binary variable which indicates if 
66 Funding Yrs of Proc Completed is less than or equal to 6 years: 1 for yes 0 
for no  
 • 89 Length of R&D Funding > 14 yrs? – binary variable which indicates if 67 
Length of R&D in Funding Yrs exceeds 14 years: 1 for yes 0 for no  
 • 90 Length of Proc Funding >= 12 yrs? – binary variable which indicates if 
68 Length of Prod in Funding Yrs exceeds or equals 12 years: 1 for yes 0 for 
no  
 • 91 R&D Funding Yr Maturity % > 80%? – binary variable which indicates 
if 69 R&D Funding Yr Maturity % exceeds 0.8: 1 for yes 0 for no  
 • 92 Proc Funding Yr Maturity % > 50%? – binary variable which indicates if 
70 Proc Funding Yr Maturity % exceeds 0.5: 1 for yes 0 for no  
 • 93 LRIP Planned Quantity < 7? – binary variable which indicates if 63 
Planned LRIP Quantity is less than 7: 1 for yes 0 for no  
 • 94 Planned Total Cost CY $M 2003 < 13,000? – binary variable which 
indicates if 1 Planned Total Cost CY $M 2003 is less than 13,000 CY $M 
2003: 1 for yes 0 for no  
 • 95 Planned Time from MS II to PDR < 9 months? – binary variable which 
indicates if 52 Planned Time from MS II to PDR is less than 9 months: 1 for 
yes 0 for no  
 • 96 Planned Unit Cost CY $M 2003 < 5? – binary variable which indicates if 
5 Planned Unit Cost CY $M 2003 is less than 5 CY $M 2003: 1 for yes 0 for 
no  
 • 97 MS III before IOC? – binary variable which indicates if the planned MS 
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Validation Table (Schedule)Table 18. 100% - Validation of Multiple Regression Model - EMD 































17 0.029411765 -0.24729238 0.470713628 YES -0.0578089 0.281230143 YES
26 0.621621622 M M M M M M
28 0.287878788 0.074948129 0.750269789 YES 0.294844171 0.530373748 NO
32 0.615384615 0.257691497 0.968595998 YES 0.451279571 0.775007925 YES
35 0.237288136 -0.08382901 0.617671336 YES 0.115661811 0.418180518 YES
36 0.049180328 M M M M M M
39 0.823529412 0.352587906 1.017344101 YES 0.583334763 0.786597245 NO
41 0.536585366 -0.00728624 0.71764389 YES 0.178445602 0.53191205 NO
44 0.258064516 M M M M M M
57 0.573770492 0.256270484 0.922576397 YES 0.485286022 0.693560859 YES
68 0.137254902 -0.18653833 0.512794351 YES 0.014399203 0.31185682 YES
70 0.06779661 -0.33133091 0.358933752 YES -0.12393033 0.15153317 YES
72 1.43902439 0.845742072 1.568075111 YES 1.032854105 1.380963078 NO
73 0.182926829 M M M M M M
81 0.941176471 M M M M M M
82 0.368421053 -0.02517241 0.656955444 YES 0.18869753 0.443085506 YES
83 0.233333333 -0.17746347 0.546412205 YES 0.008824987 0.360123753 YES
88 0.688888889 0.68292924 1.362883739 YES 0.898655777 1.147157202 NO
89 0.571428571 M M M M M M
90 0.631578947 0.536860543 1.203216232 YES 0.765821377 0.974255399 NO
94 1 0.635517014 1.353164991 YES 0.82520093 1.163481074 YES
99 1.152173913 0.673908725 1.352795742 YES 0.89056948 1.136134987 NO
103 0.211111111 M M M M M M
104 0.013157895 -0.30749398 0.411725434 YES -0.11868488 0.222916341 YES
107 0.517241379 0.076276424 0.76824457 YES 0.282408117 0.562112877 YES
108 1 M M M M M M
109 0.754098361 0.358499989 1.056926633 YES 0.560052708 0.855373914 YES
111 0.454545455 M M M M M M
112 0.077586207 -0.15605002 0.565808487 YES 0.031317622 0.37844085 YES
113 0.384615385 -0.14381852 0.529540642 YES 0.077940011 0.307782115 NO
120 0.620689655 0.336116178 1.050331636 YES 0.527755965 0.858691848 YES
122 0.031578947 -0.12684946 0.543705589 YES 0.097681826 0.3191743 NO
133 0.369863014 -0.0480574 0.629807114 YES 0.169512656 0.412237058 YES
58 1.40625 0.567463314 1.289405102 NO 0.754786012 1.102082404 NO
60 0.369863014 0.072892797 0.80042707 YES 0.25727142 0.616048447 YES








Programs % Pass % Pass
36 9 27 96.30% 59%
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(Monaco 2005) Explanation of the Independent Variables in Final Models 
The logistic regression model uses planned EMD length as one variable to predict 
the probability of schedule growth for a future program and the multiple regression 
model uses actual time from MS I to MS II plus planned EMD length as one variable to 
predict the percent of schedule growth. That is, as planned EMD length increases the 
probability and magnitude of schedule growth decreases. It is logical to assume that a 
longer planned EMD length will decrease the probability of schedule growth. And if 
growth is expected, the longer duration should lesson the percentage of possible schedule 
growth. This intuition is validated by the effect this variable has on both response 
variables.  
 The predictor variable that has the greatest impact on determining the probability 
of schedule growth in the logistic regression model is variable 96 Planned Unit Cost CY 
$M 2003 < 5?. This variable is calculated by dividing the total planned cost of a program 
by the total planned quantity of units. Variable 96 is in the top logistic regression model 
for each generation of model building from the one variable to final six variable model. 
Programs with per unit costs less than $5M have a greater probability of schedule slip. 
Just by the nature of the formula for variable 96, when the total quantity planned is high, 
or the total planned cost is low, planned unit cost will be low. In either case, variable 96 
is usually coded as a ‘1’. During the model building process, we find that as planned total 
quantity increases, the probability of schedule growth increases and as planned total cost 
decreases, the probability of schedule growth increases as well. Perhaps the increased 
probability of schedule growth for programs with low per unit costs brings light to two 
underlying issues within weapon system developments. First, technical difficulty and 
unscheduled delays may affect schedule growth for programs with a large quantity of 
units more than programs fielding only a few units. Second, programs with lower total 
costs may fall under the radar scope for oversight.  
We test this theory by looking further into the aircraft programs in our database. 
Variable 96 is coded ‘0’ for all aircraft programs in our database meaning all aircraft 
programs within our database have per unit costs greater than $5M. Aircraft programs 
have high total costs and low quantity amounts compared to other weapon systems. 
Based on the parameter estimate of variable 96, we would expect to see aircraft programs 
remain within their allotted schedule more often than other weapon system types. We 
find that this is in fact the case in our database where 50% of aircraft programs don’t slip 
compared to only 22% for all other program types. Also, for the programs that slip, 
aircraft slips by an average of 29.8% compared to 50.3% for all other program types. 
Previous research states that more management oversight is given to aircraft programs 
(Tyson, Harmon, and Utech, 1994:S-2). Also, we note that this directly corresponds to 
the parameter estimate of variable 14 Aircraft in our final logistic regression model, 
which shows a decrease in the probability of schedule growth for aircraft programs.  
Two of the variables in our final models which are cited in literature numerous 
times as predictors of schedule growth are: 21 Svs > 1? and 81 Modification?. It seems 
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likely that having more than one service involved with a program would increase the 
likelihood of schedule slippage -- more risk is involved. Our model confirms this fact as 
the probability of schedule slippage increases with the existence of more than one branch 
of the armed forces. The modification variable also mimics the findings in literature 
where modification programs exhibit less schedule growth. This makes logical sense in 
that modification programs are more technologically mature.  
Of the remaining predictor variables: 25 Service = Navy Only?, 72 % Proc 
Finding (yrs) of Total Program, and 97 MS III before IOC?, we do not find prior studies 
that directly confirm or refute the results of our models. Although we are unable to find a 
study that shows Navy only programs have a higher probability of a schedule slip, past 
literature shows that military service type is a possible predictor of determining schedule 
duration and the extent of schedule growth. For the variables 72 and 97, we follow with 
discussion on their behavior and possible meanings.  
Variable 72 % Proc Funding (yrs) of Total Program is calculated as the number 
of years of procurement funding divided by the total number of years of funding. As the 
percentage of funding increases, the probability of schedule slippage decreases. We 
believe this variable is acting as a proxy for prototype, technical maturity, and technical 
complexity. Programs with unproven technologies or technically complex developmental 
projects in many cases utilize a prototyping effort to increase the technical maturity of the 
weapon system thus reducing the risk of unscheduled delays. The binary variable for 
prototype in our database is highly correlated to variable 72. Data points in our database 
that are prototype programs show a lesser percentage of procurement funding than non-
prototype programs. We believe this also relates to the technical maturity and complexity 
of programs as they begin the EMD phase. A program with low technical risk will have a 
higher percentage of procurement funding and a lesser percentage of research and 
development funding. The effect of this variable in our model shows that a higher 
percentage of procurement funding leads to a lower probability of schedule growth.  
Our final multiple regression model shows that programs with scheduled MS III 
dates before the planned IOC dates incur a greater amount of schedule slip. Although past 
research has not looked into this area, we believe this makes logical sense. Programs that 
plan to start production prior to fielding an initial operating capability must hope for a 
smooth development phase. There is little room for unscheduled delays, technical 
problems, rework, etc. Furthermore, the data shows that programs with a planned MS III 
date before the planned IOC date have a higher amount of total quantity. Past research 
and our findings show that as the total quantity of units increases, schedule growth 
increases as well. We believe that variable 97 MS III before IOC? may be acting as a 
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